SHOULD PARENTS BE GIVEN EXTRA VOTES
ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR CHILDREN?: TOWARD A
CONVERSATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
by
Robert W. Bennett 1

I. Introduction

Approximately one quarter of the American citizens who are resident in the United
States--some sixty-two million people--are children under eighteen years of age2 who are
nowhere allowed to vote for public officials.3 Independent voting is precluded for the first few
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No official count of this population is made. I have extrapolated from 1996 mid-census
Census Bureau figures, which show approximately 26 percent of the entire resident population
of 265,000,000--including non-citizens--as under the age of 18, as well as a non-citizen adult
population of 13,000,000. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1997 (117th ed.) Washington, D.C., 1997; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Percent of
Population Voting By Citizenship Status and Selected Demographic Characteristics: November
1994, Washington, D.C. 1997. In any event, if the number of resident citizen children ineligible
to vote were added to the total eligible population, the children would represent a very
substantial fraction of the whole.
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The Twenty-Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution now forbids
withholding the vote “on account of age” from those eighteen and older. Presumably states
remain free to lower the age of suffrage below eighteen, but as of 1988 at least, no state had done
3

years of life by basic mental and physical limitations. As children age and acquire both the
physical capacity to cast a ballot and the ability to understand the idea and the mechanics of
what is involved, the continuing disenfranchisement is justified by the fact that children are not in
general reflective enough to appreciate what is at stake. We will have occasion to discuss the
“interest” that adult voters pursue at the polls, whether they do or should consider only their
own welfare conceived in a self-absorbed way, or instead factor in the interests of others or of
some broader public.4 But whatever conception of interest adults pursue when they cast their
votes, we may doubt that even older children are up to the task. In particular, there seems ample
reason to question whether children in general have learned the lesson of discounting the short
term by the long, no matter the notion of interest in play.
To be sure, the same might be said of many adults. There is no perfect, or even
reasonably obvious, standard age to separate the population with the necessary judgment from
that without. But judging fitness to vote on a case by case basis to separate the mature from the
immature is fraught with both cost and the danger that those making the case by case decisions
cannot be trusted to stick to judgments of capacity. And once an admittedly arbitrary age is
chosen within some plausible range, we can be reasonably confident that a good deal more of the
desirable perspective will be found on the adult side of the dividing line. In any event, adults
have all been children once. And an age-based restriction in the range to which contemporary
democracies like the United States have gravitated is self-limiting as children approach adulthood.
For both these reasons, we need not worry quite as much as we might with categories of adults
that the societal decision to attach the franchise to a standard age of majority reflects genuine
judgment about capacity, as opposed to the interest of those doing the excluding.
At the same time, it seems likely that the failure to enfranchise children has substantial
effects on public policy outcomes. This is no doubt a good thing, to the extent that children
might exert influence through immature or unreflective votes. But if there were a mechanism by
which the interests of children could be taken into account through more reflective voting--and
the votes of others thereby given less proportionate say--political effects might well follow that
could not so easily be dismissed. Public expenditures on schools and playgrounds, on early
intervention public health measures, or on the preservation of endangered species or of virgin
forests might be higher, for instance, and those on benefits for the elderly, or on research on
so. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 839 (1988) (Appendix A). The state
determinations then govern for state and many local elections, and for federal elections as well.
U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2; Art. II, § 1, cl. 2; Am XVII. There may be elections for some local bodies
(like school boards or park districts) where children are allowed to vote, but I have not
encountered references to any. Children do, of course, vote for student councils and the like, or
for captains of their school teams, and if the definition of “public official” were extended to such
offices, the statement in the text would require qualification.
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See TAN

, infra.

prevention of diseases that typically strike later in life, might be lower. 5
But there is such a mechanism. It is widely assumed that voters who are parents cast the
single votes they now receive in part at least in pursuit of the interests of their children.6 Why
then should those parents not be given extra votes on account of their children? There are no
doubt substantial arguments that extra votes for parents would be unconstitutional, but the most
obvious of those arguments seem a good deal less than decisive.7 And constitutional amendment
I do not mean to endorse one set of decisions or the other. I only want to suggest that
distribution of the vote will likely influence public policy choices when the numbers are as large
as they are with children. For a discussion of a variety of possibilities, see Peterson, An
Immodest Proposal, Let’s Give Children The Vote, 121 Daedalus 170 (1992). Peterson’s
discussion is remarkable both for ignoring the differences between young children and older ones,
on the one hand, and the possibility of affording the vote to parents, on the other.
5

See, e.g., Posner, Aging and Old Age 151 (1995); Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1200
Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.); Murphy, The Exclusion of Illegal Aliens From the
Reapportionment Base: A Question of Representation, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 969, 991 (1991);
Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 553,
575 (1997); see also TAN , infra, discussing the concept of virtual representation. But cf.
Wallace, Give Children the Vote, The Nation, Oct. 14, 1991, at 439 (arguing for the
enfranchisement of children and dismissing the objection “that children would vote the way their
parents tell them to, which would, in effect, give parents more votes”).
6

(7th

Assuming that one or more states adopted the extra votes idea, the argument for
unconstitutionality would build on existing reapportionment jurisprudence. Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963) was the case in which the Supreme Court first used the slogan “one person, one
vote” that was to encapsulate the conception of political equality embodied in the
reapportionment decisions. 372 U.S. at 381. See TAN , infra. The case involved a challenge
to the Georgia “county unit” system for tabulating votes, by which votes in some counties were
weighted more heavily than those in others. In its decision, the Court said that “[o]nce the
geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in
the election are to have an equal vote . . . .” 372 U.S. at 379. And in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964), the decision requiring that both houses of state legislatures be apportioned by
population, the Court found “[i]t . . . extraordinary to suggest that a State could be
constitutionally permitted to . . . [provide] that certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five,
or 10 times for their legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only
once.” 377 U.S. at 562. See also Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Gray, 372 U.S. at 381-382
(“Within a given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule--one voter,
one vote”).
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Taking off from this language, the challenge would assert that voting is a quintessentially

is always possible. That is the way in which the vote was extended to the emancipated slaves, to
women, and to eighteen year olds.8 In any event, this “utopian”9 idea of extra votes for parents
has recently surfaced in the literature concerning law and democracy,10 and I propose here to take
it seriously.
My purpose is not to endorse the idea of giving extra votes to parents on account of their
children, though neither do I want to reject it. Rather I propose to explore both the normative
appeal of the notion and the reasons--here entering the realm of positive theory--that it has
generated virtually no support and precious little attention from those who think about American
democracy. The question of the political status of children was squarely raised by the Supreme
Court’s initial reapportionment cases almost thirty-five years ago. But it remained in the
shadows until the recent phase of litigation about racial districting.11 Even now, despite the very
personal activity, so that it is one thing to extend the vote to additional classes of people but
quite another to allow surrogates in the casting of votes. The argument falters, however, if voting
is not so quintessentially personal and the extra votes are seen as cast for the children rather than
for the parents. Part III below explores the normative framework through which the question
would likely be joined of just how “personal” the vote need be.
8

U.S. Const. Ams. XV, XIX, XXVI. See also Am. XXIV, abolishing the poll tax.

9

Posner, supra note [6], at 289.

Id.; Bennett, Democracy As Meaningful Conversation, 14 Const. Comm. 481, 499 n.46,
514 (1997); Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1463
(1998); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (“It is not as if the
proposal were to give extra votes to families with more than the average number of children, a
bizarre suggestion in our political culture but one that could be defended with reference to the
concept of virtual representation.”) (Posner, C.J.); Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Cornel West, The War
Against Parents 240-41 (1998) (“Serious consideration should be given to the suggestion that
parents be given the right to vote on behalf of their children”) (emphasis in original). Professor
Jost Pietzcker of the law department of Germany’s Bonn University called my attention to the
fact that the idea has periodically garnered support in Germany over the years. See Hattenhauer,
Uber dan Minderjahrigenwahlrecht, Juristenzeitung 1996, 9, at 12, 13.
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This phase can be traced to Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), which came in the wake
of House apportionment activity prompted by the 1990 census, the first after the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. §1973 (1994). There had, of course,
been earlier cases dealing with claims of racially based districting. See, e.g., Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). And Voting Rights Act litigation before the 1990 census and
even the 1982 amendments had drawn attention to the disparities among districts between voting
and total populations that children and other non-voters can cause. See, e.g., United Jewish
11

substantial appeal of the idea--to which we will turn in Part III--the possibility that parents be
given extra votes remains largely unattended, and, once attended, is easily dismissed as “utopian”
or even “bizarre.”12 Asking why all this is so proves to be instructive about the law of
apportionment in particular and more generally about the nature of our democratic order.

II. Children and the Problem of the Apportionment Base

At first blush, it would seem more than puzzling--“astounding” might be a better word-that the electoral status of children has not received more attention. For the Supreme Court’s
reapportionment jurisprudence put the problem in plain sight. The seminal decisions, Baker v.
Carr, 13 Wesberry v. Sanders,14 and Reynolds v. Sims,15 came in quick succession in the early
1960s. Baker held that legislative apportionment issues were justiciable, Wesberry that the
Constitution requires that intrastate districting for the House of Representatives be according to
population, and Reynolds that population-based apportionment16 was similarly required for both

Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1977); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7 th Cir. 1984). In
this most recent phase courts and litigants have had to juggle an encouragement of majority
minority districting in response to the Voting Rights Act and a wariness of such districting in
response to constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1995). The juggling
required is so delicate that details--like the electoral status of children--are becoming ever harder
to miss. See TAN , infra.
Both these characterizations are by Chief Judge Posner. See Posner, supra note [6], at
289; Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998).
12

13

369 U.S. 186 (1962).

14

376 U.S. 1 (1964).

15

377 U.S. 533 (1964).

I will use the words “apportionment” and “districting” interchangeably to mean the
allocation of population in the designation of electoral districts, though they might well be given
different meanings, the first the allocation of representatives among the states according to
population, and the second the intrastate drawing of district lines. See Lavin, Understanding the
Census 393 (Epoch Books 1996).
16

houses of state legislatures.17 The Court found different textual homes for the congressional and
state legislative requirements, the former in Article I’s provision that “The House of
Representatives shall be composed of members chosen . . . by the people of the several States,”
and the latter in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We will have
occasion to look more closely at the Court’s different approaches in the two contexts,18 but the
congressional and state legislative imperatives clearly fed on each other from the outset.19 In
both contexts the requirement was encapsulated in the slogan “one person one vote.”20
From the start there was ambiguity about the apportionment status of children and other
parts of the population without the vote. For while the slogan tells us each voter’s share of the
vote in an appropriately apportioned district, it does not tell us what it means to equalize those
single shares across districts.21 It does not tell us who counts as part of the “population” that
must be divided equally among those districts. Is only the voting population to be included in
this apportionment base,22 or is one category or another of the population not eligible to vote to
All states except for Nebraska have bicameral legislatures. The equinumerosity
requirement has been extended to local legislatures, as well as many quasi-legislative bodies, most
of which are unicameral. See, e.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Board of Estimate v.
Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
17

18

See TANs

and

, infra.

Both Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18, and Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558, picked up on the “one
person one vote” language in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). Wesberry said that “as
nearly as practicable one man’s vote is to be worth as much as another’s,” 376 U.S. at 7, and
Reynolds repeated the phrase “as nearly as practicable.” 377 U.S. at 577. See Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 782 n.14 (White, J., dissenting). Reynolds did note that there might be
appropriate “distinctions . . . between congressional and state legislative representation,” but a
reading of Reynolds at the time would not, I think, have suggested the rather different paths the
Court would travel in the two contexts. See TAN , infra.
19

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964),
both quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
20

Brest and Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 1087 (1992); see also
Nowak & Rotunda, Constitutional Law 914-15 (5th ed. 1995).
21

There is also ambiguity about what might be meant by the “voting population.” In
practice the reference is usually to those eligible to vote--whether registered or not--but it might
instead refer to those registered to vote, or perhaps even to those who actually did vote in some
recent election. In any event, I do not intend to probe that particular ambiguity any further. See
22

be included? Among residents of any given state,23 these non-voters would include children, but

Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 747-48 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93
(1966).
Another problem I intend to leave to one side is why eligibility to vote is usually defined
by residence in a particular geographical location. See Judith Shklar, American Citizenship: The
Quest for Inclusion 15 (1991) (discussing early practice in some states of tying eligibility to
property without a residence requirement); Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60
(1978); but see Saphos v. Town of Savannah Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Ga. 1962). (The
requirement of residence then raises the problem of a mandatory period of physical presence
before voting “residence” is established. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)). Suffice it
to say that while non-residents may be importantly affected by legislative decisions, in the
United States these problems of geographical externality have been dealt with to a degree by
successively more (geographically) encompassing governmental units, with the more
encompassing units able to override the decisions of the less encompassing ones. See Tushnet,
Red, White, and Blue, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 70-107 (1988).
23

In addition, there are cases where “residence” for purposes of eligibility to vote is not
coincident with the place where a person is counted for census, and hence usually for
apportionment, purposes. The census, for instance, will count college students, most
government employees, and the legally incarcerated population that is eligible to vote where it
finds them when the census count is taken, while they typically remain eligible to vote in the
places they call home. And United States citizens residing abroad (other than those who never
resided in the United States) are statutorily entitled to vote in federal elections in the states of
their most recent domicile. Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
§§1973ff-1973ff-6 (1994). While these phenomena further distort apportionment counts, they
are probably a product of practical considerations rather than of any deep-seeded ambivalence
about electoral status. See TAN , infra.
A related problem to which I will turn below, see TAN , infra, is that of citizens
residing in the District of Columbia, as well as overseas territories of the United States, who
receive at most non-voting representation in the House of Representatives, and none in the
Senate.

also felons,24 and legal aliens,25 and illegal ones. In various states the population ineligible to
vote might also include categories of ex-felons26 and the mentally incompetent. 27
The Court’s initial apportionment decisions largely sloughed over this question of the
base. In Wesberry, for instance, the Court said that “as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in
a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s,”28 which in isolation--and passing
some difficulties in the notion of “worth” to which we will return 29 --suggests that those not
eligible to vote--children, aliens and the like--were not to be included in the apportionment base.
But the Court also spoke of “the fundamental goal” of “equal representation for equal numbers of
people . . . .” 30 And in Wesberry and Reynolds, the Court used, inter alia, the words “voters,”
“citizens,” “persons,” and “inhabitants” essentially interchangeably to refer to the relevant

I will use the term “felons” as a catch-all for this group, but the definition of disqualifying
convictions in fact varies from state to state. See generally, Olivares, Burton & Cullen, The
Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years
Later, 60-Sep. Fed. Probation (1996); Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship,
Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1300 n.1 (1989).
24

I mean to limit the category of “legal aliens” to those residing indefinitely in the United
States. It thus does not typically include students, tourists, or diplomats. See Aleinikoff,
Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 Const. Comm. 10 n.3 (1990). In Skafte v.
Rorex, 430 U.S. 961 (1973), the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from a Colorado decision
that there was no denial of equal protection in exclusion of legally resident aliens from the
franchise.
25

Many states do not extend electoral disqualification of convicted criminals after sentences
have been served. See Olivares, et al., supra note [24] at 11. In states that do prolong
disqualification, the definition of disqualifying crimes, the possibilities of reinstatement, and the
mechanisms of enforcement vary widely. Id.; see Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons:
Citizenship, Criminality, and ‘The Purity of the Ballot Box’, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1300 (1989);
Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A Reassessment, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 845 (1973).
26

Here too there is great variation among the states. See Note, Mental Disability and the
Right to Vote, 88 Yale L.J. 1644 (1979).
27

28

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).

29

See TAN

30

376 U.S. at 18.

, infra.

population.31
This was not an ambiguity about an incidental matter. Despite the slogan, the
apportionment decisions were not about the assignment of a single vote to each voter. In the
typical American, geographically defined, single member, first-past-the-post electoral districting
system, each voter had one vote before as well as after the Court interceded. It was distribution
of the population that mattered, and it was widely varying populations among districts that

See, e.g., id. at 7 (“voters”), 8 (“inhabitants”), 9 (“population”), 11 (“people” and
“constituents” (favorably quoting James Wilson)), 13 (“inhabitants”), 14 (“voters” and
“inhabitants”), 17 (“citizens” (favorably quoting James Wilson)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 557 (“voters”), 558 (“all who participate in the election,” “voter,” and “person” (favorably
quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-81 (1963)), 565 (“citizen” and “people”), 567
(“citizen” and “voter”), 577 (“population”), 579 (“population” and “citizen”), 580 (“citizens”)
(1964).
31

Without displaying any sensitivity to the importance that different definitions of the base
might have, the Court in Reynolds said: “[w]e realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange
legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters.”
377 U.S. at 577. And note the shifts within a single paragraph of Justice Black’s majority
opinion in Wesberry:
It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise--equal
representation in the House for equal numbers of people--for us to hold that,
within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such
a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than
others. The House of Representatives, the Convention agreed, was to represent
the people as individuals, and on a basis of complete equality for each voter.
376 U.S. at 14. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 779-81 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
The Court is occasionally joined in this casual treatment of the difference among people,
citizens, voters, and the like, by the most sophisticated of commentators:
Apportionment assigns voters to electoral districts. . . . [A] citizen placed in one
district is simultaneously excluded from all other districts. Moreover, the
Constitution’s one-person one-vote requirement means that including a particular
voter within a district demands excluding some other voter in order to equalize the
number of persons in each district.
Issacharoff and Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding In Voting Rights Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
2279 (1998).

caused the Court such concern.32 In toto the ineligible population is quite substantial in relation
to the eligible population. For obvious reasons, the number of aliens illegally residing in the
United States is hard to pin down, though a conservative estimate put the number at 5,000,000 in
1996.33 An official 1990 estimate put the entire alien population of the United States at more
than 10,000,000.34 The ineligible population of felons still serving sentences is probably less
than 1,000,000, but one commentator estimated the total of the disenfranchised felons and exfelons at about 4,000,000 in 1991.35 The number disenfranchised for mental incompetence is
also difficult to estimate, though it is not likely very large. But when all these are combined with
the population of resident citizen children, the population left in apportionment base limbo by
Wesberry and Reynolds could easily exceed thirty percent of the total. 36
Nor has the Court treated the population distribution question loosely in other respects.
For congressional apportionment, it has held that the state must “make a good-faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality.”37 State consideration of other “legitimate” concerns is

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 192 (1962); id. at 253-58 (Clark, J., concurring);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2, 7-8 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545-551 (1964).
32

33

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996 Statistical Yearbook 197 (Oct. 1997).

Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept of Commerce, 1990 CP-3-1, 1990 Census of the
Population: Persons of Hispanic Origin in the United States 3-4 (1993). As mentioned, see note
2, supra, an even softer estimate put the number at 13,000,000 in 1996.
34

Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A
New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537, 540 n.17 (1993).
35

There are also approximately 4,500,000 United States citizens in the District of Columbia
and overseas American territories, see Lavin, supra note [16], at 367, of whom perhaps
3,000,000 are potentially eligible voters. Unlike those made ineligible in various states, these
citizens in United States territories may elect some officials, while they have no voting
representation in the Congress. I discuss some of the problems created by their partial
ineligibility below. See TANs
,
, infra. There is also a population of perhaps 6,000,000
American citizens residing more or less permanently in foreign countries who are not typically
counted for apportionment purposes but may vote in the states of most recent residence.
Raskin, Is this America? The District of Columbia and the Right to Vote [forthcoming, Harv. Civ.
Rts. Civ. Lib. L. Rev.--see p. 58 of draft].
36

37

Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) (emphasis supplied).

not precluded, but “absolute population equality” remains the “paramount objective.”38 For
state and local apportionment, the Court has provided considerably more leeway in deference to
state interests in respecting internal political boundaries and the commonality of electoral
concerns that may be associated with those boundaries. 39 But even in that context the Court
scrutinizes deviation from equality to make sure that it is based in “rational” state concerns. 40
Given this general stance, the almost studied avoidance by the Court of questions concerning the
inclusion and exclusion of large groups in the apportionment base is truly stunning, and all the
more so because Justice Harlan’s dissent in Wesberry--the very first case reaching the substance
of apportionment--called specific attention to this apportionment base problem.41
For any group of non-voters that is dispersed among states and among districts within
states in proportion to its representation in the population as a whole, the decision to include or
exclude need not affect the drawing of district lines.42 In fact, however, the “proportion of the

Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983). “[In] congressional districting . . .
population equality appears now to be the preeminent, if not the sole, criterion on which to
adjudge constitutionality.” Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 37 (1975). The evidence in the racial
districting case of Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) apparently showed that “[e]very one of
Texas’ 30 congressional disticts contains precisely 566,217 persons.” 517 U.S. at 1014 n.10
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
38

39

See Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).

Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 742 (1973); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977);
but cf. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). This use of “rationality” is a reversal of the
usual approach. In apportionment law, the Court provides the norm of equality, and the state
must provide “rational” justification for deviation from that norm. More typically the state can
choose any norm, subject to the requirement that the choice be “rational.” Compare Bennett,
“Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L.
Rev. 1049 (1979).
40

Wesberrry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 21 n.4 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Footnote 4 in
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker, 369 U.S. at 189-90 discusses the use by Tennessee of
various apportionment bases. The studied avoidance is perhaps most apparent in Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746-48 (1973), where the Court discusses the dramatic effect that the
inclusion of non-voters in the apportionment base can have in congressional apportionment, but
then proceeds to other matters without pausing for reflection.
41

See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 781, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028
(1991) (Kozinski, dissenting) (“Absent significant demographic variations in the proportion of
voting age citizens to total population, apportionment by population will assure equality of
42

census population [ineligible] . . . to vote . . . varies substantially among the States and among
localities within the States.”43 Among states, for instance the percentage of children runs from
23 1/3 in Massachusetts to almost 34 in Utah.44 Of the estimated 5,000,000 illegal immigrants
residing in the United States in 1996, seven states (California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois,
New Jersey, and Arizona) apparently accounted for 83 percent of them. These seven states
contained approximately 41% of the national population.45 For legally resident aliens, there are
likely similar disproportions.
The disparities among state legislative districts or within localities that employ electoral
districting are surely even greater. The population of ineligible incarcerated felons, for instance, is
typically counted for apportionment purposes in the prisons where it is found. The population
of ineligible ex-felons is more broadly dispersed, but still likely found in disproportionate
numbers in certain minority communities. Legal and illegal aliens are disproportionately found in
proximity to citizens with similar national and ethnic origins. And citizen children are much more
heavily concentrated in some legislative districts than in others.46
Given this pattern of disproportionate distribution of those ineligible to vote, the decision
voting strength and vice versa.”). I say “need not” rather than “will not” because it is
conceivable--barely--that the inclusion decision would have some symbolic significance that
would then feed back to the politics of districting.
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Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1973).
Compiled from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997
ed. Washington D.C. 1997).

U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 1996, p. 198 (1997).
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Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 747 (1973); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
771-72 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, Board of
Supervisors, 918 F.2d 763, 774 (9 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) (“Basing
districts on voters rather than total population results in serious population inequalities across
districts”). The Census Bureau does not compile data on the citizen population in congressional
districts, but one authority proposes the data on foreign born--which is available--as suggestive.
This varies from under 2% to over 50%. See Aleinikoff, The Census and Undocumented Aliens:
A Constitutional Account, Mich. L. Quad. Notes 26, 30 (19 ). In 1992 Takoma Park,
Maryland extended the right to vote in local elections to legally resident aliens after discovering
that some of its “wards had far more eligible voters than others because some contained a large
alien population.” Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391, 1463 (1993).
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of whether to include them in the apportionment base becomes very important--in the drawing of
district lines, and in the consequent alignment of political wherewithal. To illustrate this with a
hypothetical example that will occasionally be useful as we proceed, assume that there are two
equally populated electoral districts within a state--district A and district B--each with 50,000
people and each entitled to one representative because the allocation is based on total district
population. District A, however, has 20,000 eligible voters and 30,000 ineligibles, while district
B has 40,000 voters and 10,000 ineligibles. The franchise is then distributed between the voters
of A and B not equally but with each of A’s voters receiving twice the ability of B’s voters to
influence electoral outcomes.47 In a two-way race, for instance, a voter in A need attract only
10,000 additional votes for his choice to prevail, while a voter in B requires 20,000.
Two years after first insisting on “equality” in apportionment, the Court explicitly
treated the apportionment base question,48 and it remained firmly indecisive. In Burns v.
Richardson,49 Hawaii had apportioned its state legislature using the population of registered
voters as its base. To a claim that total population was the only appropriate basis for
apportionment, the Court said:
Neither in Reynolds v. Sims nor in any other decision has this Court suggested
that the States are required to include aliens, transients, short-term or temporary
residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, in the apportionment
base by which their legislators are distributed and against which compliance with
the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured. The decision to include or exclude
any such group involves choices about the nature of representation with which we

Formal ability at least. In reality, the “ability . . . to influence electoral outcomes,” even
by voting, depends on a great deal besides the number of other voters in the district. See TAN
, infra. But whether or not the decision makes a difference to a voter as an individual, it may well
make a difference to him as a member of some group of voters in its collective effort to have its
electoral way.
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In WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964), a companion case to Reynolds, the
Court reviewed apportionment of the New York legislature that was based on population counts
of United States citizens, excluding aliens. While finding unconstitutional malapportionment, the
Court raised no explicit question about this aspect of New York’s approach, though through its
choice of words (“undervaluation of the weight of the votes of certain of a State’s citizens,” 377
U.S. at 654), it suggested that the citizen base was permissible.
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384 U.S. 73 (1966).

have been shown no constitutionally founded reason to interfere.50
The problem of racial discrimination in districting has given the apportionment base
question some incremental visibility. The use of race in the drawing of district lines is not a new
phenomenon in American democracy, but it has taken on new salience since the 1982 amendment
of the Voting Rights Act providing that neither race nor color may be used to deprive persons of
equal “opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.”51 Under this provision, members of a racial minority may assert that district lines have
been illegally drawn to their electoral disadvantage. One factor the courts consider in evaluating
such a claim is whether the number of districts where the minority in question is electorally
dominant is proportionate to its representation in the population more generally.52 Some
minority populations will have disproportionately large numbers of children, or live in proximity
to substantial numbers of non-citizens of common racial or ethnic stock with them. The Courts
have generally been clear that electoral dominance is a matter of effective ability to elect a
candidate, which means that it is judged by counts of voting population.53 But the other side of
the judgment of “proportionality” has been more troublesome. Is the “fair” number of electoral
districts to be proportionate to voting population or to total population?54

Id. at 92; see Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746-47 (1973). In Burns, the Court
insisted that Reynolds and its companion cases had “carefully left open the question of what
population was being referred to.” 384 U.S. at 91. There is no reason to think that the Court
views the congressional apportionment problem any differently under the Article I language that
is said to govern in that context.
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42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (1994).

See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). A failure of proportionality is not
dispositive of illegal “dilution” of minority voting power. For if the minority members are
geographically dispersed, they can make no claim that a minority district should have been
formed with torturous district lines. The Voting Rights Act explicitly provides that it does not
“establish a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.” 42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (1994). Indeed, any such racial
gerrymandering becomes constitutionally suspect. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013 (1994); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130,
141 (1976); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 427 n.2 (1977); City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 n.22 (1980); but see Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1227 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Or perhaps to voting age population, citizen and non-citizen alike. In Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 (1994), the Court upheld districting that provided minority districts
proportionate to “voting-age numbers.” But it sidestepped an opportunity definitively to decide
54

The difference can be crucial to legislative control in jurisdictions where voting is racially
polarized. Suppose, for instance, that district A above is inhabited solely by members of a
complaining minority, while district B is all majority. The minority then has _ of the population
of the two districts combined, but only 1/3 of the combined count of eligible voters. If the same
proportions hold in the rest of the jurisdiction, a court’s determination of which proportion to
use in judging “fairness” to the minority could make the difference between political powerhouse
and isolated opposition.55 The apportionment base question has drawn substantial attention in
racial districting decisions,56 and that in turn has drawn the attention of commentators.57 This
seems as likely an explanation as any of why the question of the political status of children
seems recently to have poked its head out into the light of day.58
The apportionment base question might have been solved by following the lead of the
constitutional text. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the House of
Representatives is to be apportioned among the various states “according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”59
“which characteristics of minority populations (e.g., age, citizenship) ought to be the touchstone
for proving a dilution claim and devising a sound remedy.” 512 U.S. at 1008. See id., at 1017
n.14, 1021 n.18. And in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), while allowing a constitutional
claim of racial gerrymandering to proceed, the Court raised no question about the state’s use of
voting age population in its initial judgment of proportionality. 509 U.S. at 634. See TAN ,
infra (discussion of differentiating among those groups ineligible to vote on the basis of
“entitlement to political regard”).
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Cf. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1021 n.18 (1994).

See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, Board of Supervisors, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.
1998).
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See, e.g., Cabeza, Total Population: A Constitutional Basis For Apportionment
Reaffirmed in Garza v. Los Angeles County, 13 Chicano-Latino Law Review 74 (1993);
Hammond, Comment, Toward A More Colorblind Society? Congressional Redistricting After
Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera, 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2151 (1997).
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See Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.).

The phrase “Indians not taxed” apparently never had any very precise meaning and was
long interpreted to mean simply all those Indians who did not live in white communities. See
Alterman, Counting People: The Census in History 293 (1969). In any event, all native
59

This provision is a post-emancipation adaptation of the approach to state representation in the
House of Representatives found in Article I section 2, where “respective numbers” was clearly
understood to refer to total population,60 except as explicitly qualified--by, in addition to the
exclusion of Indians “not taxed,” the notorious inclusion of slaves at 3/5 of a person each. In the
Fourteenth Amendment version the words “inhabitants” and “citizens” elsewhere appear,
reinforcing the conclusion that “persons” refers to all of them. And the consistent practice
throughout our constitutional history has been to use total population (save, of course, for the
explicit qualifications) as calculated by the decennial census for the purpose of congressional
apportionment among states.61
Still, this interstate apportionment might be viewed as an integral, but not necessarily
“principled,” part of the bargain necessary to secure agreement at the Constitutional
Convention.62 That is certainly the reading typically given to the 3/5 provision for the slave
population.63 After excising that provision, the Fourteenth Amendment then simply carried over
the underlying formulation. In this view, the provision for apportionment of the House among
the states would not be taken to be especially relevant to the intrastate questions raised by
Wesberry and Reynolds.64 The constitutional formulation for House apportionment among the
American Indians are now counted, so that this part of the apportionment formula is irrelevant.
See Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 809,
902 n.69 (1996); Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Publ L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C.
§1401(b) (1994).
60

See Federalist 54. But see note [61], infra with regard to illegal aliens.

See generally Alterman, supra note [59]. There is a lively contemporary dispute about
whether illegal aliens--a category that was essentially unknown at the time of the
Constitution--are to be counted in the decennial census and then in interstate apportionment of
the House. For opposed views on this question, see Murphy, supra note [6] and Aleinikoff,
supra note [46].
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Garza v. County of Los Angeles, Board of Supervisors, 918 F.2d 763, 784 n. 10 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part); cf.
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Compare Reynolds v. Sims,
397 U.S. 533, 574-75 (1964) (discussing apportionment of the United States Senate).
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Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349, 366 (1992); Diamond,
No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall’s Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42
Vand. L. Rev. 93, 108 n.94 (1989).
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See United States Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).

states will continue to hover over our inquiry, but we will mostly pursue the logic of
apportionment assuming, as has the Court, that the interstate question and the intrastate ones are
distinct. 65
In most contexts, children will represent by far the largest group of residents without the
vote, and, as we have seen, they are distributed among and within states quite unevenly.
Children are thus the group for which the decision to include or exclude has the most pervasive
effect on districting. The passage quoted from Burns does not explicitly mention children, but
children were not included in Hawaii’s apportionment base, and the decision thus likely meant
that they need not be. Still, as mentioned, the usual practice in intrastate apportionment is to use
total population. Whatever the reason for this practice,66 the result is that children are usually
included in the apportionment base. This means that “extra” votes are typically cast (or at least
extra “voting power” is exercised) on account of children--as well as on account of others
included in the apportionment base but not entitled to vote. If the entire ineligible population in
districts A and B above consisted of children, for instance, the enhanced voting power of the
voters in A would be attributable to the higher proportion of children in the district.
A number of intriguing questions are suggested by this excursion into the problem of the
base in the law of apportionment. Why is it that only two years after insisting on equality in
apportionment in the name of the Constitution, the Court found no constitutional significance in
this apportionment base question? Can it really be that equally populated districts are important
in constitutional terms, but that the inclusion or exclusion from the count of population groups
that may approach, or conceivably even exceed, half the total in some districts is of no
constitutional moment?67 And if total population need not be used, are the differences among
Congress has authority to preempt the states with regard to the “manner” of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives. U.S. Const., Art. I, §4, cl. 1. In exercise of this
power Congress has now required that elections for the House are to be held in single member
districts. 2 U.S.C.A. §2c (1997). The result is that intrastate House apportionment is required in
all states entitled to more than the constitutional minimum of one House member.
65
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See TAN

, infra.

In an insightful dissent in the racial voting rights decision in Garza v. County of Los
Angeles, Board of Supervisors, 918 F.2d 763, 778 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028
(1991), Judge Kozinski concludes that Burns can best be understood as requiring that
apportionment be based on voting rather than total population. He continues: “The only other
way to explain the result in Burns is to assume that there is no principle at all at play here, that
one person one vote is really nothing more than a judicial squinting of the eye, a rough-and-ready
determination whether the apportionment scheme complies with some standard of
proportionality the reviewing court happens to find acceptable.” 918 F.2d at 784. I offer a
different sort of explanation, see TAN , infra, but Judge Kozinski well sensed the internal
67

non-voting groups irrelevant, so that it matters not which are included? In particular, would the
exclusion of citizen children be of no more significance than the exclusion of illegal aliens, or of
legal ones? And if children (and others) are to be included in the base, are they to be ignored in
the intradistrict assignment of voting power? If one group or another of non-voters is included in
the apportionment base because its members are treated for electoral purposes as individuals
with interests entitled to political regard, in other words, are the voters of the district generally
the appropriate group to represent those interests, or would some more limited group be the
appropriate repository of that “extra” voting power attributable to non-voters? Or, perchance,
has the Court’s numerical approach to apportionment, and its justificatory rhetoric, led us
astray, beguiled by the allure of a democracy that is unattainably remote from the one we have?
To grapple with these questions, we should initially look behind the reapportionment
decisions, to get a handle on the normative underpinnings of apportionment, and, more generally,
of representative democracy in the United States. It should not be surprising if the normative
ground shifted between the time that Article I grappled with apportionment in the 1780s and the
Supreme Court did so almost two hundred years later. A great deal about American democracy
changed on the ground over that span. Not all change on the ground brings change in normative
thinking, but neither are the two isolated phenomena. Rather norms for living and the facts of life
almost inevitably influence each other on an ongoing basis. After attempting in Part III to bring
into focus the normative picture contemplated by the apportionment jurisprudence--and its
implications for the electoral status of children and other non-voters--we will be in a position in
Part IV to ask explicitly why the children question remains obscure still in thinking about
American democracy.

III. Apportionment, The Franchise, And
Strains of Normativity In American Democracy

A. Introduction.
Historians and political theorists have identified two competing visions of the way in
which participants in American democracy might approach the public decisions they are called
upon to make. 68 These could be given different labels, but “republican” and “liberal” should

tension in the Supreme Court’s approach to apportionment.
See generally, Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 443 (1989); Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic 1776-1787 46-90 (1969); Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 24-30 (1989); Mueller,
Constitutional Democracy 47-48 (1996).
68

do.69 Each is said on occasion to characterize the way the system actually works--at least
sometimes or to some degree--but they operate most obviously as normative visions, as opposed
to positive or descriptive ones. The line between normative and positive accounts is, however,
not nearly so bright as is sometimes supposed, and it is easy to become ensnared on the
relationship between the two. An introductory word about that relationship is in order.
A normative account provides a model or standard against which something about the real
world may be judged better or worse. Its purpose may be justification of what is, but often the
purpose will be to bring about improvement. For this latter purpose, however, an ideal that is
too far removed from the reality it is to instruct will seem ill-suited to the job.70 For this reason,
normative theories conceived with betterment in mind will usually have substantial points of
connection with the portion of the reality that as a whole is thought to require improvement. If
the instruction takes hold and the reality moves closer to the normative ideal, the points of
connection may increase. Or, if the instruction does not take hold, or does not seem likely to, the
normative theorist may make further concessions to reality by introducing additional points of
connection in the hope of increasing the chances of bringing reality around.
An account that starts out as descriptive is similarly susceptible to seduction by
normative visions. We are dealing here with theories of a very complex social
system--democracy in the United States--of which any complete description is out of the
question. Selectivity is essential, and that has two important, and related, consequences. The
first is that there must be some basis for selection. That basis may be hard to discern. It may
involve a degree of chance selection. And it may well remain unstated, or even unappreciated.
But even if unappreciated, the inspiration for selection will often be some normative stance.
When asked to describe American democracy, for instance, the respondent’s selection of what to
say will likely reflect his favorable or unfavorable, even if inchoate, judgment about the system.
A fan might say something like “self-government through the rule of the majority,” or “a system
for maximizing individual prerogative within an ordered society,” while a detractor might reply
“an excuse for the use of state force to squelch a dissenting minority,” or “a system tending to
assure that people of only modest ability rise to positions of authority.” The second
Each of these terms is used in common and scholarly parlance with quite different
shades--or even colors--of meaning. In the case of “liberal,” the problem is especially acute, since
it can include either deep skepticism of, or essential trust in, the possibility of constructive
government action. For those familiar with recent writing on the “republican” revival, the
meanings I give to the terms may be fit for quarreling but should not seem awkward. See, e.g.,
Michelman, supra note [68]; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988).
Still, there is the possibility of confusion. After agonizing a bit, I stuck with these terms because
they do capture the distinction I want to highlight, and because I could not do better. I would
only ask the reader not to read more into the terms than the constrained meanings I assign them.
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“Ideals . . .should . . . be relevant to human possibilities.” Dahl, supra note [68], at 284.

consequence of selectivity is that some degree of inaccuracy will remain in the most sophisticated
accounts. There will thus always be material with which to contest the descriptive accuracy of
some depiction of complex social phenomena. The inclination to contest, and its terms, will again
often reflect the contestant’s normative stance or presuppositions.
With such constant interaction, normative and positive theorizing can easily become
intermingled in the imagination. I will hope to minimize any confusion by calling attention to
intermingling that may invite it. But I do not pretend that the normative accounts discussed in
this Part III, or the positive one presented in Part IV, are hermetically sealed from infestation
from the other realm. Thus, the republican and liberal visions I present initially are pure ideal
types. In pure form neither one counsels extra votes for parents on account of their children, but
an accommodation of the two just might. In working toward that accommodation, I will
repeatedly check the one vision or the other against parts of American political reality. That
should not be taken to show, however, that the accommodation at the end is descriptively
accurate. To the contrary, we know that parents are not given extra votes. That and a great deal
else about the reality of American democracy remains distant from the republican and liberal
visions of that democracy--and also from Part III’s melding of the two. Part IV grapples with
that reality, presenting a positive account of American democracy that attempts to explain the
inattention to the extra votes possibility. It purports to explain a great deal else besides, despite
the fact that, like all descriptive accounts of complex phenomena, it is incomplete and thus
inevitably subject to contest that may be normative in inspiration.
B. The Republican and Liberal Visions.
In the pure form with which I start, both the republican and liberal visions contemplate a
small community where individuals entitled to engage in “self-government” do so in person , and
in meetings convened for that purpose. For our discussion the principal fault line between the
two is in the spirit with which democratic participants approach public decisionmaking in these
public gatherings.
The republican vision is a communitarian one in which political participants deliberate
through reason and decide selflessly about the interest of the entire community. This is in
contrast to the personal aims that even republicans may pursue in their private lives. What is
required for participation in the decisionmaking process is wisdom and the ability to put one’s
own interests to the side when engaging matters of the public good. A good republican arrives at
the interest of the whole not by trading or counting, but by reasoning. If the final decision is
taken by vote, that is almost incidental, for the process of reasoning should allow the best answer
to emerge, perhaps even to the point of consensus. To be sure, additional information may aid
the process, and that may counsel broad participation. But wisdom and a capacity for
selflessness are essential in the decisionmakers, and that may counsel somehow restricting
participation, for not all members of the broader community might be expected to have the
required wisdom or capacity for self-denial.

There is a certain republican ambiguity about the reach of societal concern. The
community about which republicans deliberate might be thought to have an integrity of its own,
so that its interest is not reducible to some combination of the interests of its constituent
members. In that case there would be no pressing need to say just who is and who is not a
member. It might seem, however, that a community as a whole could have no interest that was
not somehow a function of the individual interests of its constituent members, in which case the
importance of membership would loom large.
There may be important advantages to the republican in leaving that ambiguity
unresolved. For it allows him to sidestep what may be difficult questions of membership, and
also the real possibility that if the interests are those of individuals, conflict among those
interests may be all too apparent. These will prove to be vexing problems, but however they
may be resolved, it is important to note that there is no required coincidence for the republican
between those who decide and those whose interests may matter. The good republican is one
who is able to subjugate his private interests as he reasons through to decision about the
interest--or interests--of the whole.
The liberal approach to governance is in contrast an individualistic one, where citizens
pursue the same ends in public deliberations as they pursue in private affairs. Even for the liberal
there must be a difference in the form of decisionmaking in the public and private
realms--multilateral voting, as opposed to bilateral bargaining or unilateral action. There may also
be an associated difference in the tone and procedure of decisionmaking, for nothing will ever get
done in a public gathering of more than a very few people without formal and informal norms of
decisionmaking, such as a degree of civility and deference, and rules of order enforced by a
presiding officer. And the liberal engaged in governance faces a “collective action” problem, how
to assure that the collectivity can take action that will redound to the benefit of most or even all
members, when each might make himself better off by withholding his cooperation. These all
pose variants on the liberal’s problem of how to attract the trust of others if each is to assume
that others are, like himself, only interested in their own welfare.
However these problems are solved, in the liberal vision the end of government is a
summation of the private interests of those who take part in decisionmaking. And, since
individuals do not come to public decisionmaking with any spirit of self-sacrifice, the only
acceptable rule for weighting interests is that of equal regard for each. For the liberal, the
summing of equally weighted private interests, effected through a vote in which each counts for
one, is all that might be meant by the interest of the community as a whole. In contrast to the
republican, the definition of who gets to vote is fundamental for the liberal. For it is only through
the vote that one’s interests can be made to count.
C. The Move to Representative Government.
The move to representative government introduces complications for each vision, for
decisionmaking now has two phases and many slippery questions of the relationship between

them. To simplify matters, I am going to assume that the legislative decisionmakers are chosen in
popular elections, in American style single member (two in the case of the United States Senate)
geographically defined districts.71
For the republican, selfless decisionmaking is surely required at the legislative level, but is
it also required of members of the electorate in the selection of the legislature? The stakes in
answering that question are high, for the viability of the republican ideal may be in play. If there
is electoral selflessness, then it is easy to imagine that the representatives chosen will be selfless
as well, so that they can concentrate on the public good. The mechanics of the system will then
seem relatively unimportant. The drawing of district lines, for instance, becomes important--if at
all--only because representatives of different areas may bring different bases of information to the
legislative process. Beyond information, what is required is wisdom and self-denial, and those
traits are not geographically defined.
But the move to representative government must raise doubts about whether selflessness
can be sustained at the electoral level, when the function of electors is so centered on the choosing
of others to make the decisions that will ultimately matter. And if the republican comes to doubt
electoral selflessness, can doubts about the public spiritedness of representatives be far behind?
For how is it that the representatives chosen will bring to their task a public-spiritedness that
those who put them in office do not necessarily share? Concerns like this may lead the
republican to worry a great deal about the details of the electoral system. Restriction of
eligibility to vote in the search for a self-denying subset of the citizenry is an obvious possibility.
Indirect election of representatives and bicameralism may seem attractive. And the details of
districting may seem important. While geographical districting might have some informational
purpose, it simultaneously suggests the variability of interests that the republican wants to deny
or suppress. If districting is taken as given, however, it might seem, for instance, that larger
districts with many competing interests would make it more likely that representatives chosen
could play the district interests off against each other and thus achieve breathing room for public
interest decisionmaking.72
The move to representative government might seem also to jeopardize the mechanisms of
liberal decisionmaking. How can the liberal achieve effective representation of the interests of
citizen voters who are mostly not present when the decisions are made? This is a problem not
only of the absent citizens, but of the present ones. If individuals engaged in liberal
self-government are assumed to pursue self-interest, the liberal might worry that representatives
The Senate was, of course, originally chosen by the state legislatures. U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 3, cl. 1. The Seventeenth Amendment now requires popular election.
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This is, of course, an extension of one of Madison’s argument for an extended republic.
See TAN , infra. For additional possibilities for republican tinkering with the details of the
electoral system, see TAN , infra.
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would pursue not their constituents’ interests but their own. This difficulty is real, and we will
return to it,73 but initially at least popular election might be seen as a mechanism by which the
electorate as a whole could produce in the legislature a smaller version of itself.74 The decisions
of the legislative assembly might then be thought to replicate those that would have been
produced by an assembly of the whole. And if perchance the legislature was unfaithful to such a
charge, it could be turned out of office by self-interested voters the next time around.
D. American Embrace of the Liberal Vision.
While both liberal and republican visions played prominent, and intermingled, roles in
American political imagination from the start, by most accounts the republican vision was
especially influential in our constitutional beginnings.75 For the most part it was only free white
propertied adult males who were allowed to vote, for it was only they who were thought capable
of approaching decisionmaking in good republican fashion.76 Government was representative in
form, to be sure, but there was revolutionary fervor with attendant sense of community, and the
population of the country was minuscule compared to the modern day. At the time of the
revolution, the entire population approximated that of my hometown of Chicago today.77
Philadelphia was the largest city, reaching a population of about 40,000 by the time it played
host to the Constitutional Convention. Virginia was the most populous state, with a total free
population of under 300,000 people according to Thomas Jefferson’s 1782 estimate. Of that
300,000, fewer than 60,000 were males 21 years or older,78 and fewer still met the property
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Probably the most prominent early American exponent of such a view was John Adams.
In a letter to John Penn, for instance, Adams said that a legislature “should be an exact portrait, in
miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them.” Quoted in
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60 (1967).
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See generally, Wood, supra note [68], at 53-65; Dahl, supra note [68], at 24-28.

John Adams held, for instance, that propertyless males, like wives and children have no
“judgment of their own [for t]hey talk and vote as they are directed by some man of property.”
Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776, quoted in Steinfeld, Property and
Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 335, 341 (1989). Adams is just one
example of important early figures who sounded liberal notes along with republican ones. See
note [74], supra.
76

77

Alterman, supra note [59], at 168.

78

Id. at 169, 178.

qualifications for voting. In such a setting it may well have been possible to imagine that the
processes of government, even if representative in form, involved the great bulk of the voting
population in an ongoing and active way, and in a spirit of self-sacrifice.79
But the tensions in a representative republicanism are not easy to contain or hide. Indeed
they had been on display front and center in the disputes between England and the colonies. For
with the colonists’ battle cry of “no taxation without representation,” they were objecting not
simply to an inability to explain why taxation was unfair. The representation they craved
entailed not only a chance to be heard, but to vote. Their lament assumes that there are particular
interests, not just that of the whole, that the particular interests of some will often clash with
those of others, and that the particular interests of some cannot simply be entrusted to the
republicanism of some of those others.
The great English statesman Edmund Burke appreciated the tension. In republican
fashion, Burke believed that there is in “one interest, . . . the general good,”80 but he
simultaneously sympathized with the colonists’ complaint that they were unrepresented. Burke
tried to hold the package together, as republicans had before him, with the notion of “virtual”
representation:
If a part of the kingdom is being well governed, its interest secured, then it is
represented whether or not it has the franchise; if it is not represented actually,
then it can be said to be represented virtually. Virtual representation is that in
which there is a communion of interests and a sympathy in feelings and desires
between those who act in the name of any description of people, and the people
in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them.81
But what would explain why virtual representation would suffice for some Englishmen, but not
for the colonists? Burke’s answer was that virtual representation had to be based in real
attachments, which were absent in the case of the colonists. 82 But that simply served to
highlight that distributed representation served some purpose. The purpose might be
informational, but it became hard to deny that separate interests were at work, interests that
would often conflict, thereby calling into question the reality of a unitary common good. And
once representation was in order, who other than those whose interests were at stake was to say
Dahl, supra note [68], at 289; Wood, supra note [68], at 102; Michelman, Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 54 (1986).
79
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that some interests could be represented virtually while others required actual representation?
Given the American experience, the possibility of virtual representation, initially advanced in aid
of the republican project, may well have helped expose its frailty.
We can catch glimpses of both republican and liberal visions, and of some of the tensions
between them, in early American thinking about politics and governance. In debates about the
length of legislative terms, for instance, shorter terms found their defense in a liberal desire to
bind representatives to constituents through the electoral mechanism, while longer terms were
embraced by republican sentiment as fostering dispassionate and unpressured deliberation about
the public interest.83 In parallel fashion, direct election of members of the House of
Representatives “by the people” would provide liberal responsiveness, while the Senate,
originally to be chosen by the state legislatures, would foster republican deliberativeness.84
In his classic study of early American political ideology, Gordon Wood captures the
confused intermingling of liberal and republican themes in debates about legislative
apportionment and extension of the franchise, the matters that, in contemporary guise, form the
centerpiece of our inquiry:
if men were compelled to think about it some sort of conception of virtual
representation was a necessary concomitant of their republican ideology and their
Whig belief in the homogeneity of the people’s interest. Yet ironically those who
were most radically Whiggish, most devotedly republican, were at the same time
most committed to the characteristics of the concept of actual
representation--equal electoral districts, the particularity of consent through
broadened suffrage, residence requirements for both the elected and the electors,
the strict accountability of representatives to the local electorate, indeed, the
closest possible ties between members and their particular
Compare Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, in I The Debate on
the Constitution 526, 548-49 (Bailyn ed. 1993) (desirability of “short period” of legislative
service) and “Cato” V, id. at 401 (“safe democratical principles of annual [elections]”) with
“Americanus” V, id. at 490 (longer terms afford “the members more time to acquire a knowledge
of public affairs competent to the station they fill”) and “A Citizen of America,” id. at 140
(longer terms of senators will allow them “gradually [to] lose their partiality, [and] generalize
their views, and consider themselves as acting for the whole”).
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Compare Federalist 52 (House to have “an immediate dependence on, and an intimate
sympathy with, the people”) with Federalist 63 (a “well-constructed Senate . . . . may be
sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary errors and
delusions”). The constitution also provides that members of the House of Representatives must
be twenty-five years of age (and seven years United States citizens), while Senators are required
to be thirty (and citizens for nine years). U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, cl. 2; § 3, cl. 3. These
differences too might be thought to relate to the different conceptions of their roles.
84

constituents--characteristics that ran directly counter to the central premises of
virtual representation and all that they implied about the nature of the body
politic.85
American electoral politics has undergone great change since those beginnings. The
increase in population and the growth and diversification of the economy have been of profound
significance. No longer is it possible in most governmental contexts in the United States to think
of the entire population, or even of some large subset of it, as reasoning together toward solutions
to the community’s problems. Our government is representative, in form and in fact. There have
been other changes of surpassing importance. Slavery has, of course, been eliminated, and over
time the franchise has been gradually but vastly extended to the great bulk of the adult citizenry.
The United States Senate, originally to be selected by state legislatures, is now chosen by that
expanded electorate.86 So, effectively, is the President.87 Since these two in combination choose
the members of the federal judiciary,88 even the holders of that “non-political” office are more
closely tied to a broadly-based popular election process than was the case in the original scheme
of things.
The extension of the franchise is usually and rightly depicted as affirming the competence
and dignity of all individuals in our democratic polity.89 While efforts are made to reconcile the
changes with a republican vision, they are, as Wood suggests, much more comfortably assimilated
to a liberal one instead. When virtually all adults take part in decisionmaking, it is difficult to
maintain that participation in decisions is confined to those truly capable of self- denial. Nor is it
credible that a mass of decisionmakers produces decisions that are fundamentally self-denying.
When virtually all adults count, to put the point somewhat differently, and count for a large
sweep of decisions affecting people who are mostly strangers, decisionmaking at the electoral
level must increasingly seem to be a matter not of selflessly reasoning together, but of doing the
counting.
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The President is chosen by what has come to be called the “electoral college,” consisting
of electors from each state appointed “in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct.” U.S.
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Even if a republican throws in the towel on any claim of a self-denying electorate, he
might cling to a hope that the representatives chosen would be capable of public spirited
deliberation. James Madison had held that a representative legislature might “refine and enlarge
the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.”90 But this suggests weak ties
between legislators and constituents, while the move toward ever greater sweep for popular
elections insinuates a strengthening of those ties.
So, at least, the apportionment decisions seem to assume. According to the Court in
Reynolds, “each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political processes of his State’s legislative bodies,” which is to be achieved “through the medium
of elected representatives.”91 It might be possible to put a republican gloss on such language.
Representatives still might view their task not as responsiveness to constituents but rather as
refining and enlarging “the public views.” But the service of republican reasoning at the
legislative level is a most unlikely prop for assigning constitutional importance to equal
distribution of the franchise. The Court’s reasoning in Reynolds conjures up an image of the
popular vote as a mechanism by which representatives are tamed by members of the electorate,
and in equal measure.92 Taming representatives in the interests of their constituents, rather than
freeing them from those constituents, is to bend representative government to a liberal rather than
a republican form.93
This is not to say that by the time of the reapportionment decisions, republican themes
had been banished from American political discourse. For one thing, we can cling to ideals no
matter how much they have been outrun by what happens on the ground. There is in fact a
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See Michelman, supra note [70], at 472. Actually Professor Michelman strives mightily
in that article to find republican themes in a second generation of Supreme Court apportionment
decisions, where the Court grappled with questions of the franchise in selection of
representatives for local governmental units that deal with a limited range of subjects. Id. at 45885. But even in that relatively congenial context, republican themes are not easy to find in what
the Court had to say. In the end, Michelman concedes that “[i]t is a hypothesis I offer rather than
a claim.” Id. at 486 (italics in original). Cf. Neuman, “We Are the People”: Alien Suffrage In
German and American Perspective, 13 Mich. J. Int’l L. 259, 321-22 (1992).
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lively contemporary literature explicitly trumpeting republican themes.94 But even more
importantly, only the republican vision leaves some room for the possibility that is hard to shake
that there is a part of the population not admitted to the vote but nonetheless entitled to political
regard.
It may be that the question of political regard, and its relationship to the vote, was
camouflaged a bit in the move to representative government on a large scale, for that move raised
something of a question for eligible voters and ineligibles alike about how their interests would be
protected.95 There may be further protective coloration in the fact that there is room in the
liberal vision for the interests of those without the vote. We are social beings, who define
ourselves and our interests in significant part in terms of relationships with others. To the extent
that the liberal recognizes this root fact of social existence, he will appreciate that interests of
those not charged with decisionmaking may enter into the most self-regarding contribution to the
liberal calculus. With this in mind, it may begin to seem that the line between the liberal and the
republican visions is not as stark as initially it seemed. We saw earlier that the republican may
sense that it is not simply some disembodied “public interest” that is caught up in the public
decisions that are to be made, but real, and varying, interests of discrete individuals.96 In that
case, republican self-denial would be an ability to subjugate one’s own private interest not so
much to a community interest but to the private interests of others. It might then be hard to tell
a good republican from a good liberal, a decisionmaker who is subjugating his own interests to
those of others from one who has incorporated the interests of others into his own.
Still, this provides no final escape from a liberal dilemma about entitlement to regard of
those without the vote. Liberal consideration of others resides in the discretion of the liberal
voter. It thus does not answer the possibility of entitlement of non-voters to political regard.
Nor does it explain the disenfranchisement. For the liberal, each person gets to decide what are in
his own interests, so that some cannot effectively vote for others. And finally, the possibility
that a voter may cast his one vote partly out of concern for another does not respond to the
liberal vision’s requirement of accounts for political regard that count each entitled person as one.
The republican vision can be put to service in filling those spaces. In addition to its
flexible definition of entitlement to political regard, republican themes can explain
disenfranchisement, for republicanism ties the vote to a capacity for wisdom and subordination
of one’s own interests, capacity that need not be coincident with entitlement to regard. And
through the device of virtual representation, republicanism might come to the liberal’s aid in his
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note [70]; Sunstein, supra note [70]; Sandel, Democracy’s
Discontent (1996).
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accounting dilemma. Of course, using republican filler for liberal spaces does not necessarily
make for a pretty whole. But the two visions have coexisted and mingled from the start in the
American political imagination. There would thus be nothing all that new if the liberal view
borrowed support from its rivalrous but constant companion.
E. Entitlement to Regard: children and others ineligible to vote.
We know that there is a substantial part of the resident population in the United States
that is ineligible to vote. But is that population entitled to political regard? If there is no
population at once ineligible to vote yet entitled to regard, then the disenfranchisement creates no
particular problem for the liberal view of things.97 Once representatives are assumed to be tamed
by the vote, mechanisms seem to be in place with which to fulfill the liberal ideal for the voting
population. But in the liberal spirit of the apportionment decisions this would require that
districting be based on voting population, and, as we have seen, the prevailing practice is to use
total population.
Reasoning backwards from the prevailing apportionment practice, perhaps the entire
population is entitled to political regard. As we have seen, the extra voting power of the eligible
population of District A above need not be seen as “extra” at all, but rather cast on account of an
ineligible population that is entitled to regard in the processes of government.98 The pure liberal
Cf. Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The dignity and very
concept of citizenship are diluted if noncitizens are allowed to vote either directly or by the
conferral of additional voting power on citizens believed to have a community of interest with the
noncitizens”).
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The majority opinion in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, Board of Supervisors, 918 F.2d
763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) seems to reach this conclusion. Garza
involved a Voting Rights Act claim of discrimination in districting for the Los Angeles Board of
Supervisors, brought on behalf of an Hispanic minority. The claim turned on whether the
Hispanic population was sufficiently large to support a district of its own, and the court held
that the Hispanic proportion of the total population was the basis on which to evaluate that
question. See TAN , supra. In doing so, the court made clear that total population was also
the preferred apportionment base, and that this was so for two reasons. First, if voting
population were used, then people in more populous districts “will suffer diminishing access to
government,” including the “right to petition their government for services and to influence how
their tax dollars are spent.” 918 F.2d at 775. And second, “[a]dherence to a population standard
. . . is more likely to guarantee that those who cannot or do not cast a ballot may still have some
voice in government.” Id. The first of these points may represent solicitude for the voting
population of the district, on the assumption that even an ineligible population assumed to have
no entitlement to regard would in fact impose burdens on legislators, thereby diminishing the
ability of those legislators to serve voters. In the liberal spirit of the apportionment decisions,
98

vision will not admit of such a possibility, of course, but perhaps it might be made more
palatable even within a basically liberal framework if some republican explanation could be
provided for the disenfranchisement of those who are nonetheless entitled to regard.
There is a third possibility. Even if apportionment is based on total population, only a
part of the ineligible population (or at the extreme even none of it) might be entitled to political
regard. Counting population for apportionment purposes is precarious business for a whole host
of reasons. Given the mobility, fertility, mortality and inexorable aging of the population, any
count, no matter how precise, is out of date even before it is publicly available; and it rapidly
deteriorates from there.99 Given that basic fact of apportionment life, even the most committed
liberal theorist might find it hard to get exercised about counting inaccuracies produced by
slippage between the apportionment base and entitlement to regard. This is especially so since
the most dependable counting is done for the national census, which comes only once a decade
and is focused on counts of total resident population because of its constitutional attachment to
interstate apportionment of the House of Representatives. If some more limited base were
thought ideally appropriate for intrastate apportionment purposes, further imprecision could
often be expected from an effort to quantify that base.100 In the face of these problems, the
liberal theorist might become resigned to basing apportionment on total population, despite the
fact that some or all of the total was not thought entitled to political regard.
Even more likely is that the issue of entitlement to regard is not joined. The Supreme
Court made that possibility especially inviting by its casual treatment of the apportionment base
in Burns. Many decisions importantly affecting portions of the population that Burns leaves
with ambiguous apportionment status--aliens and children most obviously--are made on the
federal level. Under Burns the liberal accounts could become quite confused if the national
representatives of some states were to extend regard to those populations, while the
representatives of other states did not. There is no obvious route out of this liberal dilemma. It
might then seem the path of least resistance for the liberal simply to ignore the problem, taking
some comfort perhaps from republican strains that muffle the importance of entitlement to

that part of the problem would seem better dealt with by enhancing the staffs of overburdened
legislators, rather than the voting power of their “real” constituents. The court’s second point,
however, assumes that those ineligible to vote are nonetheless entitled to a “voice in government.”
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746 (1973) (“The United States census is more
of an event than a process”). Nor is the census count all that precise to begin with. See Cocco,
Now that I’m in GOP-Land, I’m Sure to Count, Newsday, Sept. 3, 1998, at A55.
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regard.101
Despite the uncertainties, it does seem possible to do a bit of parsing of contemporary
assumptions about entitlement to regard for elements of the ineligible population. A large part
of that population consists of citizens, and that status is strongly suggestive of entitlement.102
Cutting across the citizenship/non-citizenship divide, in liberal terms disenfranchisement denies
entitlement, while inclusion in the apportionment base affirms it. In the face of such
contradictory signals, the strength of any conviction we can muster about entitlement to political
regard might be influenced by any help republican notions of capacity can provide in justification
of the disenfranchisement. In what follows I will suggest how these and assorted other
considerations might be thought to bear on the regard question for categories of those ineligible to
vote. But the treatment I give here is only summary, for my eye is on the children question, and
the other categories of ineligibles become relevant mostly for the shades of contrast they provide.
Non-citizens who have entered or remain in the country illegally do not present a
particularly appealing claim of entitlement to regard. They share our humanity with us, of
course, and the Constitution does extend important rights to illegal resident aliens.103 But in
liberal terms, receipt of a measure of regard in fact need not imply entitlement to it.104 By
definition illegally resident aliens are not “legitimate” members of the community, and for that
reason any claim to regard borders on the oxymoronic.105 The frequent inclusion of this
population in the apportionment base, moreover, is readily understandable if legally resident
aliens are entitled to regard. For the legally resident aliens are the more numerous, and
disaggregating the two presents serious difficulties in practical terms.106
Non-citizens who reside legally in the country present a good deal more appealing claim
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“[The] citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry.” Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253, 268 (1967); see also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 165-66 (1874).
102

103

See, e.g., Plyler v.Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Aleinikoff, supra note [25], at 18.

104

See TAN

, supra.

See Murphy, supra note [6]. One commentator has suggested that illegal resident aliens
be allowed to vote. See Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of
Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1139, 1220-23.
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See Federation for American Immigration Reform, 486 F. Supp. 564, 573-74 and note 12
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to regard. They are not citizens, of course, but their attachment to the community is entirely
legitimate, and often quite productive.107 Indeed, in some instances their initial immigration will
have been courted.108 Many members of this population are serving a probationary period
awaiting citizenship.109 Short of the franchise, this population is accorded a high degree of
attention and respect in political and legal processes.110 And it is possible to come up with a
republican rationale for the disenfranchisement. Non-citizens might be viewed as insufficiently
committed to the societal enterprise or imbued with the ability to appreciate societal needs, quite
apart from claims they might have to regard.111

Among the reasons offered in Garza v. County of Los Angeles, Board of Supervisors, 918
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028 (1991) for the conclusion that the entire
population of a district is entitled to political regard is that the entire population has “a right . . .
to influence how their tax dollars are spent.” 918 F.2d at 775. But see Camarota, Does
Immigration Harm the Poor? 133 The Public Interest 23 (1998). As the passage from Garza
suggests, productivity does not necessarily distinguish legal from illegal aliens, though any
contribution of the latter must presumably be diminished at least by immigration enforcement
costs they impose.
107

See Clausing, Bill To Increase Work Visas for Foreigners Gets New Lease on Live, N.Y.
Times, October 14, 1998, at C3; Friedman, Help Wanted, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1998, at A5;
Cushman, An Agreement to Increase Visas, Sept. 24, 1998, at A23; Patrick, Reduction in
Recruitment, New York Law Journal, at 1.
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interests taken into account.”); Neuman, supra note [90], at 322 n. 376 (“Resident aliens have
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See Michelman, supra note [68], at 461. There was a time in our history when legal
aliens were afforded the vote in a significant number of American jurisdictions. See Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1874); see generally Neuman, supra note [90], at 292300; Raskin, supra note [46] at 1397-1417. In a limited number of local jurisdictions, they are
accorded the vote still, including, for instance, in elections for local school “councils” in Chicago.
See 105 Ill. Comp. Stat 5/34-2.1 (West 1998). Pleas are often heard that their franchise rights be
broadened again. See Raskin, supra note [46].
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The pieces of the puzzle of entitlement to regard are hard to fit together for the
population of (citizen) felons still serving sentences. As citizens, of course, they would seem to
have a claim, and that impression is reinforced by their inclusion in the apportionment base. This
is especially so, since exclusion would likely be manageable, given the relative ease of counting
and the defined geography in which this population is typically found. Still there are some
suggestions in the literature that those convicted of serious crimes have forfeited their claims to
regard.112 Perhaps more plausible is that felony convictions raise doubt not about entitlement to
political regard but about republican capacity in this group to bring a degree of self-denial to the
decisionmaking process.113
Even more difficult to understand in terms of entitlement to regard is the practice of some
states in disenfranchising ex-felons. As a practical matter exclusion of ex-felons from the
apportionment base would be virtually impossible, so that nothing much about entitlement can
be inferred from their inclusion. Still, it is hard to credit the suggestion that after readmission to
most of the standard perquisites of membership in the community save the vote, ex-felons have
no claim to political regard. Again the most plausible explanation for the disenfranchisement
might be doubt about capacity, 114 though that explanation too seems strained for persons who
have been readmitted to society in other respects.115
We have also thus far neglected the liberal--and constitutional--anomalies of United States
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(1976); Stanford Note, supra note [26]; Harvard Note, supra note [26]. Justice Marshall’s
dissent in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974), provides a critical examination of the
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In terms of electoral outcomes, the questions raised by disenfranchisement and
apportionment treatment of felons and ex-felons are far from academic, since the numbers
involved are significant, and members of racial minorities are disproportionately represented in
both populations. See Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the
Black Vote: The Need for A Second Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145, 1153 (1994); Shapiro, supra
note [35].

citizens in American territories abroad and in the District of Columbia.116 By virtue of the
Twenty-third Amendment, citizens in the District now participate in the presidential selection,
albeit with some important matters left not to the District government but to Congress.117 And
they, along with citizens in the overseas territories, may elect local officials with a degree of real
authority.118 While with minor exceptions each of these groups has a non-voting presence in the
House of Representatives, they have no full voting representation there and are thus not deemed
relevant to the national apportionment process.119 In the Senate, of course, they do not even
have a presence. Putting aside the admittedly large complication of presidential involvement in
national policymaking, such treatment would seem to imply in liberal terms that these
populations are not in national matters entitled to political regard.
At least for the adult citizen population of the District of Columbia, this is still difficult
to swallow in liberal terms. In the first decade after formation of the District, its residents
continued to vote in Maryland or Virginia, the two states that had ceded the territory for
formation of the District. This practice apparently ended with the assumption of full control by
the federal government in 1800. At that time, the District had less than 15,000 residents, far
fewer than the 50,000 minimum set by the Northwest Ordinance for consideration of a territory
for statehood.120 The national legislative scheme already in place made no allowance for the
District, and its relatively small permanent population no doubt made the electoral status of its
inhabitants easy to ignore. In addition there may have been some republican sentiment at work
that entrusted the interests of citizens in the District to the selfless deliberation of
representatives from the States.121 But this is a story of historical accident rather than of no
Residents of American Samoa are not citizens but rather “American nationals” who owe
“permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21), (22) (1994). See GAO
report OGC-98-5, U.S. Insular Areas 6 (Nov. 7, 1997).
116
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In addition to the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa have voting representation in House committees, but not in the actions of the
body itself. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 25(a) (District of Columbia); 48 U.S.C.A. §§ 891, 1711, 1731
(Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, American Samoa). The Mariana Islands have a
“representative to the United States” who is not at this point afforded any formal status by the
House. GAO Report, supra note [116], at [15]. 48 U.S.C.A. § 180.
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entitlement to regard. District residents are physically in our midst and to all appearances share
fully in our collective ups and downs. In such a setting, their continued disenfranchisment is
most easily understood as the product of partisan political standoff. Inclusion in the presidential
selection process might then be taken as a sign of liberal sensitivity to the point.
American citizens in overseas territories are differently situated. No doubt historical
accident also plays a role in their national disenfranchisement, but their geographical isolation sets
them apart from citizens in the District. That isolation may raise doubts about whether they
possess the information base requisite for republican capacity in public deliberation. But it may
also raise questions about their claim to regard, despite the formalities of citizenship. The
importance of geography in defining the community presupposed by a liberal calculus has no
doubt been diluted in the modern day. The projection of armed force and of cultural influence
around the globe mean that members of one community can be absorbed through force or
agreement into another remote from it. Thus Hawaii and Alaska are now member states of the
United States, and Puerto Rico may one day follow suit. But geographical isolation surely makes
the sense of common cause, and hence of claim to regard, more difficult to sustain.122
Be all this as it may, for two categories of those ineligible to vote the claim to entitlement
to regard is very strong. These are resident citizen children and those citizens disenfranchised
solely on account of mental incompetence. For in areas that use total population as the
apportionment base, the only ambiguous indication about regard for these groups is their
disenfranchisement, and in each case the disenfranchisement is readily understandable in terms of
capacity. Indeed even the committed liberal theorist might welcome republican capacity cover
for extending entitlement to regard for these two categories of the disenfranchised. For in the case
of children and the mentally incompetent, the liberal assumption that only the individual is in
touch with his own interests meets its most severe challenges. 123 For children at least--far the
larger and more visible of these two groups--the contemporary rhetoric of law and politics in the
United States seems resounding in its insistence on entitlement to political regard.124
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Cf. Barnett v. Daley, 32 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994). I see little basis for quarreling
with this proposition, for the signs of societal concern for children are all about. One of the most
popular versions of Indiana license plates, for instance, proclaims “kids first.” See also Goldfarb,
supra note [110], at 1452 (arguing that “[i]ncluding children in the local apportionment base . . .
is not only desirable but is also probably required constitutionally . . . .”); but cf. Rutherford,
supra note [10], at 1494.
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Still, there is a certain awkwardness in much of the evidence that could be adduced,
because a great part of the solicitousness of children takes the form of subordination to their

F. Providing the regard: adult ineligibles.
While inclusion in the apportionment base might be thought necessary to make liberal
accounts balance, it is not sufficient. As we have seen, inclusion of a group of ineligible voters in
the base results in votes effectively being cast on account of that group.125 But without the
vote, the ineligible population is still deprived of the liberal mechanism by which its interests are
made to count. What is required, once the disenfranchisement is taken as given, is something like
the virtual representation that republicans suggested when they sensed the heat of the liberal
challenge. For if a group of voters that achieves “extra” voting power because of the inclusion of
ineligibles feels a “communion of interests and . . . sympathy in feelings and desires” with that
ineligible population, and it deploys its extra voting power accordingly, the representatives
selected might similarly reflect that sympathy and thus be thought the mechanism for bringing
the liberal accounts into balance. But such virtual representation is more easily achieved for some
ineligible groups than for others.
We might, for instance, doubt that much communion and sympathy is felt by voters for
any ineligible imprisoned population thought to be entitled to regard. This is especially so in
practice, since the extra voting power is typically assigned to the voters in whose district a
prison is located rather than to any population more likely to have ties to the prisoners of family
or friendship.
For any population of non-citizens, the possibility of the required feelings of
connectedness are more promising, but still highly uncertain. For purposes of illustration,
assume that the entire ineligible population of our hypothetical districts A and B above, consists
of non-citizens entitled to regard. If the eligible and ineligible populations are both largely
immigrant, with a common language and similar patterns for their countries of origin, that might
parents, or, when that mechanism is thought likely to fail, to the state. As just one example of
the resulting tension (as well as the basic supposition that children are entitled to regard), here is
Justice Powell struggling with a question of the legal prerogatives of adolescent girls in making the
abortion decision:
Properly understood . . . the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent
with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic
presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1979).
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plausibly supply a degree of the desired attachment, so that the voting population of the districts
could represent “virtually” the interests of the ineligible population.126 Decisions under the
Voting Rights Act, and the law and politics of racially cognizant districting more generally, may
assure a degree of commonality of interest within districts for the citizen and non-citizen
elements in certain racial groups.127 And given residential patterns, the happenstance of the
drawing of district lines may provide a degree of the desired connection within districts for other
immigrant groups as well.
Still, for non-citizens there will likely often be a large scale mismatch between the
provision of the “extra” voting power and the degree of attachment that might justify it in virtual
representation terms. There is nothing in the law of apportionment or of racial districting that
requires attachments within districts.128 Indeed, if too much of a particular racial minority is
“packed” into a given district, the courts will lend a sympathetic ear to a Voting Rights Act
challenge on the ground that such packing dilutes the political force of that minority in the polity
as a whole.129 We thus cannot say much about the real extent of attachment in our illustrative
districts without closer inquiry into the demographics of the districts. In fact it is entirely
plausible to imagine that virtually all of the 30,000 non-voters in our hypothetical District A
would be Hispanics awaiting citizenship but that only 10,000 of the 20,000 voters in the district
would be Hispanic. In that case, half of the extra voting power on account of the ineligible
population of the district would be provided to the 10,000 voters with no special attachment to
the non-voters. And even this way of discussing the problem considerably oversimplifies it, for
there is enormous diversity--and no doubt occasionally tension--among groups within the
Hispanic population. At the extreme, if a population of recent immigrants still ineligible to vote
is included in a district where the eligible population has no particular attachments to it--to say
nothing of the possibility of open hostility--the “extra” votes for the eligible population finds
scant justification in some “virtual representation” that it provides.
For any non-citizens entitled to political regard, however, it might be that the liberal
theorist searching for a vehicle of virtual representation can do no better--once

See Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (1998) (“if it is assumed that citizen
and noncitizen Latinos have a strong community of interest, then giving citizen Latinos extra
voting power based on the number of noncitizen Latinos gives the latter a kind of representation
in the political process.”) (Posner, C.J.).
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disenfranchisement is taken as a given. A “political thicket”130 would await both legislatures and
courts if they announced a principle that districting with an apportionment base that included
non-citizens was required to assure some high degree of commonality of countries of origin or
other salient indicia of common interests between eligible and ineligible populations. Short of
such an initiative, there may be no alternative to providing any extra voting power on account of
non-citizens to the eligible--even if sometimes not particularly sympathetic--voting population in
a district as a whole.
The prospects for virtual representation that might be thought effective are even more
bleak for disenfranchised ex-felons and the mentally disabled. Whether institutionalized or not,
there seems no reason to think that the districts in which the mentally disabled are found will be
disproportionately populated with voters who feel some special sympathy with them. And the
same is likely true of ex-felons. One might search for some more defined population that could
wield surrogate voting power on account of these categories of ineligibles. Close relatives or
friends are possibilities. For the mentally disabled, legal guardians come to mind. But there may
be no appropriate persons available. Even legal guardians for the mentally disable may identify
with their charges in only a limited way. In any event, the allocation of the extra voting power,
and verification of its proper assignment, would often present severe administrative problems--to
say nothing of resentment of the “paternalism” involved. Under the circumstances, for the liberal
in search of a vehicle of virtual representation there may again be no practical alternative--once
disenfranchisement is taken as given--to placing faith in whatever representation is provided by
the district population at large.
Again a somewhat different perspective is necessary for the electorate of the District of
Columbia. Because the District is afforded no voting representation in the national legislature at
all, the only virtual representation that might be thought to be available to the District population
in the Congress would be that provided by the voters and representatives from the rest of the
country. Any such wholesale use of the notion might actually be closer to the original republican
ideal for legislators131 than the more modern adaptations that I have suggested. Given the
importance that the District has for the country as a whole--and its visibility to the
Congress--such virtual representation may even have a measure of contemporary descriptive
plausibility. It could probably be found, for instance, with less strain than could virtual
representation of a population of legally resident aliens in a district with few voters who share
ethnicity with the aliens. In any event, once the disenfranchisement is taken as given, it is again
hard to see how we could, as a practical matter, do better.

This was Justice Frankfurter’s phrase in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946),
to characterize the difficult problems the Court would encounter if it engaged questions of
intrastate congressional apportionment, as, of course, it eventually did in Wesberry.
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For any population in overseas territories, or living in foreign countries, and entitled to
regard but not the vote,132 virtual representation in national affairs would also have to be
provided through the Congress as a whole. In those cases, however, while again we can probably
do no better, any suggestion of real connectedness that might make the representation effective
seems quite strained.
G. Providing the regard: children and the extra votes possibility.
The problems in providing virtual representation for adult ineligibles are substantial, but
for the most part those problems melt away for resident citizen children, for whom parents are
the obvious repository for the extra voting power. Just as with the mentally disabled we might
wonder whether legal guardians would be appropriate surrogate voters. But the overwhelming
proportion of children are in the care of one or both parents. Those parents regularly make
decisions for their children, and that power is grounded in longstanding tradition founded on
powerful psychological attachments. 133 There is no apparent reason why surrogate voting might
be thought less justified on account of those attachments than the myriad of other decisions that
parents make for children. In virtual representation terms, the present practice of reposing the
extra power in the district voting population as a whole is perhaps more promising for children
than it is for any of the other groups of ineligibles, simply because there is an effective guarantee
that some of that extra voting power will be exercised by parents. But that is only to emphasize
that in terms of liberal accounting, concentrating the power in the parents would be preferable to
the present dispersion among parents and non-parents alike in the district voting population.134
Nor do there appear to be inordinate practical problems in assigning the votes to parents.
Registration of children and identification of their parents (or legal parent substitutes) is routinely
done for school and other matters at the present time. Half-votes could solve the problem of two
parents with an odd number of children. For separated parents, there is the possibility that one
parent (or even both) would vote in a jurisdiction where the child did not live and hence was not a
For the electoral and apportionment status of American citizens residing permanently in
foreign countries, see note [23], supra.
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Interest Analysis, 62 Va. L. Rev. 285, 307-17 (1976).
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Thus I am puzzled by Chief Judge Posner’s choice of words in discussing “virtual
representation” of children in Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998). After
characterizing the extra votes possibility as “a bizarre suggestion in our political culture,” see
note [10], supra, he says that giving extra votes to a racial or ethnic group “which happens to
have a higher than average number of children . . . . is not a ridiculous idea.” Id. at 704.
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part of the apportionment base. But that problem would likely pale into insignificance compared
to the present disjunction between the apportionment base site and voting jurisdiction we
tolerate for college students and government employees.135
A series of “political” problems seem more serious--even apart from resistance to
providing some voters with “more” votes than others. There are citizen children of non-citizen
parents--indeed even of illegal alien parents.136 Any suggestion that votes might be cast by that
alien population would surely be controversial. Perhaps even more troubling would be
assignment of the extra votes to public officials in the case of “wards of the state,” children in the
custody of public institutions.137 Still, to the liberal imagination these problems should seem
trivial in the face of the potential for substantially more sensitive “liberal” voting for a full quarter
of the nation’s population.
Introduction of the extra votes idea might highlight the contrast with the situation of adult
ineligibles. Once the problem of children had been satisfactorily resolved in these adjusted liberal
terms, questions of entitlement to regard for adult ineligibles, and related questions of the
apportionment base, might be harder to ignore. The District of Columbia disenfranchisement is
an issue already squarely on the national agenda.138 For any other disenfranchised adult group
deemed entitled to regard, the diffusion of extra voting power among the district population as a
whole might seem hollow, given the directed representation that children had achieved. To the
committed liberal theorist, however, bringing such neglected issues to the fore should simply add
to the attraction of the extra votes idea.
H. Conclusion.
Here then is the normative appeal of extra votes for parents on account of their children.
It would provide meaningful representation for a population the entitlement to regard of which
seems broadly taken for granted. It is grounded in the liberal vision and its basic belief that
See note [23] supra. I would not think it necessary for “liberal” sensibilities to allow
parents to split their votes among candidates, but even that should be manageable if it were
thought desirable.
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politics is about adding up private interests, though it is republican in its faith that at least part of
the accounting can be accomplished by the representation of the interest of one by another. And
it might even induce us to face more forthrightly other shortcomings in our attempts to
implement the liberal vision. In the liberal terms that dominate apportionment jurisprudence, and
a great deal else that is said about contemporary American democracy, extra votes for parents on
account of children at least merits serious consideration, if not immediate adoption. But it has
not caught on, and is still hardly noticed. The question to which I now turn is why that is so.

IV. Children And Apportionment
In Conversational Perspective

A. Introduction.
The normative terms introduced in Part III do not necessarily resolve the question that
frames the background for our inquiry. We might find it inappropriate to give parents extra votes
on account of their children because we would rather live with unfairness to children than let
loose of the liberal assumption that no person can make electoral decisions for another. Or
perhaps we believe that children are less than full members of the community, and as such less
than fully entitled to have their interests count. A third possibility is that we do not want to
forsake a rather pure republican ideal in politics, in which legislators do not represent
constituencies so much as deliberate about the interests of the public as a whole, children
included. Or, finally, we might reject the idea on practical grounds, or ones of expediency. Even
if our vision is a basically liberal one in which children’s interests should count, and even if we
appreciate that the best way to make them count is to give extra votes to their parents, we might
hold back because it would be complicated to proceed. We would have to allocate votes between
two parents, making provision for half votes, and even the possibility of a single voter dividing
his multiple votes among candidates. We would have to deal with politically charged possibilities
like voting by non-citizen parents on account of their citizen children, or voting by state officials
for wards of the state. And we might even find ourselves urged to face the electoral status of
citizens in the District of Columbia, of the imprisoned population, and of ex-felons--or even of
legally resident aliens--more forthrightly than we have.
The discussion in Part III nonetheless leaves us with a real puzzle, for it makes clear that
none of these objections is terribly powerful once the issue is joined in the liberal terms that
dominate much contemporary discourse about American democracy. In a liberal representative
democracy, there is powerful appeal to the suggestion of extra votes for parents. And yet the
idea has hardly surfaced, and, on most of the rare occasions when it has, it seems to be easily
dismissed as “utopian,” or even “bizarre.” How could it be that a suggestion with such
normative appeal--and one with great potential to change the pattern of public policy
decisions--is ignored, or, worse, unnoticed?
A large part of the answer, I believe, is that the idea is utopian, in the sense that there is a

very great distance between the reality of American democracy and any description that might be
coaxed out of the normative terms that counsel extra votes for parents. In Part III we saw that
however close American democracy and our ways of thinking about it may once have been to a
republican ideal, over the years a substantial distance has emerged. In a number of respects, the
direction of movement has been toward the liberal vision. But that does not mean that American
reality is now fashioned in a liberal image. Inattention to the extra votes possibility helps us see
that American democracy remains remote not only from the republican ideal but from the liberal
one as well. Nor is it plausibly thought of as approximating the republican adaptation of the
liberal ideal that we fashioned in justification of the extra votes notion. Parents are not given
those extra votes. Rather, I will argue, American democracy produces substantial and broad
based satisfaction through mechanisms not captured in liberal or republican terms. This
satisfaction produces a substantial degree of stability, and that stability provides little room--or
occasion--for the extra votes idea to catch on.139
This is not to deny that a normative vision--like that behind the extra votes idea--may
grab our collective attention, producing pangs of conscience causing a degree of disruption until
we pay them heed. That is certainly a plausible account of the emancipation movement and the
long struggle to secure voting rights of the former slaves and their descendants.140 It is also a
plausible way to view the suffragette movement that resulted in the extension of the vote to

The stability I have in mind is itself a complex phenomenon. For change is always with
us, and indeed the stabilizing forces I have in mind can also be engines of democratic change.
Political instability, as I conceive of it, is disorderly political change, as well as it precursors, like
threats to produce disorderly political change, violence directed to such change, or even manifest
signs of deep dissatisfaction that find no ready avenues toward orderly change. Compare
Mueller, Constitutional Democracy 201 (1996). The American Civil War was a major instance of
instability. It radically changed the nature of American democracy, and it was accompanied by
both violence and repeated instances of unaccustomed ways of proceeding. The 1995 bombing of
the federal building in Oklahoma City, in contrast, produced little actual change in American
democracy, though it may have been intended to produce change and might have succeeded had
conditions been different. As the violent examples above (and lots of others that might come to
mind) suggest, the United States is not without signs of instability, but in comparative terms
American democracy must be deemed quite stable. It is, for instance, the longest lived among
major contemporary democracies. This is all the more remarkable, given the fact that the United
States is populated by an extraordinary variety of racial, religious, and ethnic groups, which
heterogeneity is typically thought to make instability more likely. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note
[68], at 263.
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women.141 Something like that may yet happen with the normativity that undergirds the extra
votes idea. There are at least hints that the idea is in the air today in a way that it was not just
five years ago. But it is still hardly a puff of wind, let alone a moral thunderstorm. I do not
pretend to profound insight into what gives some normative visions their social energy, but thus
far the normative case for extra votes for parents has left the stable reality of American
democracy quite undisturbed. In this Part IV I sketch a way of viewing that reality that can at
least help us understand the quiet.
I call this positive account “democracy as meaningful conversation,” and I have elsewhere
discussed it at some length.142 Here I will summarize its major elements, including a few
refinements, and then concentrate on how the electoral and apportionment phenomena we have
been scrutinizing might be appreciated in conversational terms. It is important, however, to recur
to the earlier discussion of positive theories of complex social phenomena.143 Democracy as
meaningful conversation is in no sense a comprehensive account of American democracy,
whatever that might mean. Nor is it subject to the kind of rigorous proof that the natural
scientist might demand. For large scale social phenomena like American democracy, “[p]roblem
complexity denies the possibility of proof.”144 Instead, we are in search of “informed
argument,”145 that can provide a “base for thinking,” and thus help us “organise our
thoughts.”146 It is in those terms that I think that a conversational account of American
democracy succeeds. For it brings together disparate aspects of American democracy, from its
foundational elements through a host of more incidental but telling phenomena. Indeed one of the
most compelling arguments to be made for the “accuracy” of the conversational account is its
ability to explain some sounds of silence in the functioning of American democracy--like the
silence about the electoral status of children.147
An interesting account can be found in Stansell, The Road From Seneca Falls, The New
Republic 26 (Aug. 10, 1998).
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Nor is the conversational account pure description unaffected by normativity. For I was
drawn to it as a way to explain the degree of fidelity that American democracy commands. I do
not deny that such fidelity could be misplaced, but my personal stance toward American
democracy is largely one of appreciation and admiration. Democracy as meaningful conversation
is thus for me a vehicle for helping to understand what makes an essentially good system hold.
As such, the conversational account may raise stability-based alerts (positive as well as negative)
about one or another proposed change. But the conversational account is decidedly not a
normative theory offered either to improve the system or to understand what it is that is good in
the system at present. It in no way denies the possibility of improvement in non-conversational
ways. For stability produced by conversation or other means will be normatively unattractive if
what is stable is infirm.148
I proceed in Section B with a discussion of the gap between liberal vision and American
reality suggested but largely unattended by the discussion in Part III. I have treated this subject
before as well,149 but Parts II and III above have laid the groundwork for a supplemental
treatment here. Section C provides the sketch of the conversational account, and in Section D I
return to the electoral and apportionment phenomena with which we have been grappling, this
time to grapple in conversational terms.
B. The Gap Between Liberal Vision and American Reality.
i. introduction. The most obvious way in which American reality diverges from the
liberal ideal is the utter implausibility of the assumption of an equal weighting of interests for
those entitled to regard. The failing is not just the slippage one might expect in combining a
multitude of interests through complex and fallible social mechanisms. Nor is it some simple
function of the hard reality that resources, and attendant ability to work within the political
system, are not evenly distributed among those entitled to vote. Those problems paint in part of
the picture, and the failure sensibly to account for children in a liberal calculus is also a part. But
some of the gap precedes all of this, in ambiguity in what equal weighting of interests might
mean. And even if we are able to force our way through that ambiguity, a gap is produced by
elements quite consciously built into the constitutional system in the United States. Indeed,
among the major formal institutions of American government on a national level, not a one of
them is well-suited--even in isolation--to effectuating a liberal summation of individual interests.
In combination, they produce a picture that is fanciful to describe in liberal terms. Some of the
holes might be filled in by republican touchup via virtual representation, but not, I fear, enough to
produce even an approximation of a liberal pattern for the whole.
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ii. fundamental ambiguity. A fundamental ambiguity in what the equal weighting of
interests contemplated by liberalism might mean shows up even in our pure setting of direct
liberal democracy. (To make the possibility somewhat real, we might imagine a contemporary
condominium association large enough to have a complex “public” agenda but small enough that
its members grapple with that agenda in person.) Typically when we talk of majority rule, at
least in the context of direct democracy, we mean that a majority of those entitled to vote decides
on issues one at a time as they are taken up. We mean that in part because there seems to be
normative purchase in such an understanding. An adulteration of the democratic ideal is often
thought to be involved if some members of a voting body allow a vote on one issue to be affected
by sentiments on other issues.150
But issues do not come prepackaged. If there are three unpaved roads in a jurisdiction,
for instance, liberal voters may decide very differently if the question of paving those roads is
joined one road at a time, on the one hand, or combined in comprehensive paving legislation on
the other. And this problem is related to a broader normative question of whether democratic
decisionmaking really should take issues one at a time, however they are defined. For treating
issues discretely counts positions on issues but does not weigh the depth of feeling on those
issues.151 Some persons may care deeply about an issue while others may be close to
indifferent, even as they lean one way or the other. It is not at all clear that a vote in which each
counts for one treats “equally” the interests of people so differently disposed on the subject of
the vote.
A requirement of unanimity for decision rather than a majority would assure that no
person loses from the eventual vote, 152 but a decision rule of unanimity raises the possibility
that great gains would be neglected on account of trivial loses to some minority, unless there were
a mechanism of side payments by which those inclined to say ‘no’ on the substance of a vote
could be induced to consent. In the political arena, the compensation could come in the form of
votes on other issues, and that suggests that the unanimity and the net societal gain might
appropriately come not on discrete issues but on the entire public policy agenda. Positions on
separate items on that expansive agenda could be traded to the end of maximizing satisfaction
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over the entire electorate, with each voter’s “satisfaction” given equal treatment.153
I will call these two notions of what equally weighted votes might mean a “pure” and an
“intensity” model. The normative clash between the two is likely replicated on a descriptive
plane. On the one hand, the temptation to trade seems built into the human DNA. But that
temptation will meet a variety of obstacles in a democratic arena. In the real world, voting on the
entire agenda of some voting body will often be impossible. An “entire” public agenda must at
least be limited to some time frame, but for an ongoing body any such limit may be objectionable
to some voter with just a bit longer time horizon. And unanimity as the decisional rule is
impractical once a voting body of some size and an agenda of appreciable scope is in prospect.
In addition, vote trading is not likely to be all that effective as a mechanism for weighing interests.
Money is the universal solvent in the private market that allows us to measure the value of one
item against another, and also to keep track of inflow and outflow. Vote trading, in contrast, has
all the inefficiencies of bartering, and then some. Unlike freewheeling bartering, in the legislative
arena the only things that can be traded without running afoul of bribery laws are those that have
made their way onto the public agenda. And even trades of votes on agenda items would not be
legally enforceable, no doubt in part because of the strains of normative disapproval. These
problems suggest that even descriptively democratic voting in direct democratic settings likely
migrates between action on discrete issues and action that takes account of varying packages of
issues. The pattern of “democratic” results could not then be expected to reflect with any
consistency either a pure or an intensity model of equal weighting.
iii. simple representative government in single member districts. Legislative bodies are
similarly limited in any attempt to capture the interests of their members in pursuit of a public
policy agenda.154 But the point of representative government for the liberal is not to aggregate
the interests of the members of the legislature, but of those members’ constituents. The liberal
effectiveness of representative government thus depends in addition on the extent to which
legislators might be thought to be faithful conduits for the interests of their constituents. We
passed over this difficulty in our earlier discussion of the liberal ideal, relying on an assumption

I leave aside an even more intractable problem of whether the totality of each person’s
interests in the entire public policy agenda is to be accorded equal weight or whether “equality”
even across the entire agenda requires adjustment for some “objective” measure of what each
individual has at stake.
153

Since it is American democracy we are investigating, I’ll confine the discussion here to the
typical American setting of single member geographically defined districts. I’ll further assume
that the representative system has been massaged by the Supreme Court’s equinumerosity
requirement. And finally, just to simplify matters, I’ll assume that selection of representatives is
a choice between only two candidates. If anything, this should make it more plausible that some
form of the equality ideal is within reach.
154

that the popular vote is an effective mechanism for bending representatives to the voters’ will. 155
That genuinely competitive elections deter officials to a degree from pursuing purely personal
aggrandizement in office is not to be doubted, but there is every reason to doubt that popular
election causes representatives somehow to embody within their own legislative behavior a
summation of equally weighted constituent interests. This is no doubt in part because we retain
a republican model of legislating, but it is also because the conduit cannot be made to work.
The normative ambiguity about what equal weighting should mean is in no way dissipated
by the introduction of representative government.156 Nor is the descriptive complication. The
legislator must represent a package of public policy positions, and the voter must take that
package as a whole.157 If the voter is assumed to use his vote as a self-interested liberal, his
choice of candidates will necessarily reflect some weighting of the relative importance to the voter
of the various issues in the package. To enhance his chances for election (and reelection) the
candidate would like to understand voter sentiment weighted just as the voter would weight it.
But the signal the voter gives is simplistic in the extreme--candidate A or candidate B. For the
candidate this does not even disaggregate constituent sentiments among issues, let alone convey
information about intensity on discrete issues.
In addition the majority vote rule of decision means that a candidate need not be
concerned about any voter sentiment not necessary for election (or reelection). This would cause
serious problems for any intensity weighted descriptive model of representative democracy, but
it also complicates a pure model. For a representative legislature can be composed of people
who in the aggregate commanded a minority of the popular vote. This may not happen very
often,158 but it is entirely possible in a winner take all system, where elections in one district
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The normative appeal of taking issues one at a time is reflected in a variety of rules and
practices in the legislative context. These include the fractionation of legislative consideration of
issues through the use of committees, limitations of legislation to single subjects, item vetoes for
executives, and even the modern movement in favor of term limits for legislators. Some of these
are discussed in Eskridge & Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation 250-61 (2d ed., West
Pub. Co. 1995). Both indicative of and tending to enforce the norm is that any deals struck
would not be legally enforceable.
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This should be qualified in that voters can influence their representative between
elections, see TAN , infra, but that does not greatly disturb the basic reality that voters take
their candidates’ positions on an all or nothing basis.
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Indeed the usual tendency is for districting to lead to overrepresentation of the majority
party. See Polsby, & Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry Into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering
Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 652, 669 (1993); Dixon, Representation Values
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may be close and that in another not so close.159 In any event, there is no basis whatsoever for
assuming that a legislature elected from single member districts will be a microcosm of the society
as a whole.
There is the possibility of communication between elections as a mechanism for
conveying detail and weights with regard to particular issues. Much ink has been spilled
exploring the democratic role of organized “interest groups” or ”special interests” in the
production of public policy. Such groups are more likely to be formed and their agendas more
likely to be vigorously pursued through the use of lobbying if the individuals behind them have
intense interests in those agendas. And since the lobbyists for such groups can be heard between
election seasons, interest groups might be thought to be a mechanism for informing legislators of
the intensity of their constituents’ sentiments on particular issues.
No doubt interest groups have some such effect, but they too are likely to operate in the
most crude fashion as conveyors of the intensities of constituent sentiments, for at least two
reasons. First, interest group lobbying will at best “weigh” only the interests of individuals that
are individually large enough to justify the expenditure of resources on the group.160 As interest
group theorists are at pains to stress, the combined interest of those with such an incentive can
easily be less than the aggregate of opposed, but dispersed, interests. More generally the
incentive to organize politically depends heavily on the distribution of interests, and not just on
their magnitude over the entire population. And second, lobbying through organized groups must
be a very imprecise way to convey the intensity of sentiments even of the group’s members.
Lobbyists can be more or less effective advocates. If their constituencies are at all sizeable, they
will likely have little sense of the range of intensities among them. Indeed it may be doubted if
lobbyists for organized groups have much incentive to convey any such complexity about
intensity they come to appreciate.
All this suggests that the actual pattern of public policy outputs to be expected from
simple representative democracy will be an unstable and unpredictable amalgam of three forces, a
pure model of actual or likely voter preferences, an intensity model of such preferences, and
legislator pursuit of personal public policy inclinations. That may well make simple
and Reapportionment Practice: The Eschatology of “One-Man, One-Vote,” in Nomos X, supra
note [92], at 170, 175, 195.
Dixon, supra note [156], at 171, 180; see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1003-06 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“At best” in part because even those with interests sufficiently large to justify group
activity have an incentive to “free ride” on the activity of others with similar or greater interest.
To the extent that such free riding takes place, the interest group will be ineffective to capture
and convey the interests of the riders.
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representative democracy normatively preferable to lots of competitors, but it provides little
justification for any claim of fulfillment of a liberal ideal.
iv. American complexity. Even if we were to convince ourselves that simple
representative democracy produced results that approximate one or another conception of the
liberal ideal of equal weighting of interests, those who designed the American system of
government introduced great complexity that surely causes its decisions to produce further
distortions. Bicameralism means that public policy measures must clear two legislative hurdles
rather than one.161 The Continental Congress had been unicameral. Nonetheless it was
essentially taken for granted by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that the national
legislature should have two houses,162 and at least part of the idea was to provide a calm “second
look” before action became final.163 But the second look in congressional bicameralism is quite
different from a revisiting by the same body or even by one that could be assumed to be roughly
equivalent to the one that looked initially.164 Rather the two houses of the American Congress
are very differently constituted from one another, and the result surely is that the most
considered judgment of one house is more than occasionally frustrated (or compromised) for
want of bringing the other house around.
Neither of the two houses of our bicameral national legislature, moreover, is individually
crafted in a liberal image (as imagined in the reapportionment cases). This is most obvious with
regard to the Senate, the apportionment of which by states leaves it worlds removed from the one
person one vote prescription. Less noticed is that the House of Representatives is not all that
close to a liberal ideal either. The constitutional requirement that each state have at least one

161

Three if we count the executive wielding the veto as a “legislative” hurdle.

The Virginia Plan, which became something of an initial agenda for the Constitutional
Convention, provided that “the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.” I
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 20 (Farrand, ed. Yale U. Press 1966).
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James Madison, who believed that “the facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the
diseases to which our governments are most liable,” argued in Federalist 62 that bicameralism
would double “the security of the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in
schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be
sufficient.”
163

164

As Madison well understood. See Federalist 62.

representative--and that congressional districts not cross state lines165 --means that the number of
constituents varies quite significantly from one House member to another. Thus Montana’s
delegation to the House was reduced from two to one by virtue of the 1990 census. The
Supreme Court upheld that action despite the fact Montana’s single district would have a census
population of 803,655, while the average district population in the country as a whole would be
572,466.166 That is a divergence of over 40%, far higher than the Court has tolerated in the
intrastate congressional apportionment context. 167 And more generally, with House districts
confined within state borders it is to be expected that some districts in less populous states will
diverge quite substantially from the norm.168
The Constitution provides that “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
states.” Am. XIV (italics supplied). While this is not entirely explicit, the practice has been, and
the intention surely was, as stated in the text.
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Dept. Of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 445 (1992).

In Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Court found unconstitutional
malapportionment of New Jersey congressional districts where “the population of the largest
district [was] . . . less than one percent greater than the population of the smallest district”-527,472 to 523,798. 462 U.S. at 727-728. The Court was thus a little fast and loose when it said
in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) that:
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One principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates [to the
Constitutional Convention]: that, no matter where he lived, each voter should have
a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress.
376 U.S. at 10. Even as to interstate districting, and putting aside the realities of “voice”
discussed in the text, see TAN , supra, the delegates did not succeed in effectuating such a
“principle.” In the Montana decision, the Court did say that “it is by no means clear that the
facts here establish a violation of the Wesberry standard.” 503 U.S. at 461. But that was true
only in the sense that the constitutional House apportionment in which each state is entitled to a
minimum of one representative but no district may overlap state boundaries makes the goal of
“precise mathematical equality,” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 520-31 (1969), “illusory
for the Nation as a whole.” 503 U.S. at 463.
It is entirely possible--and indeed routinely happens even since the reapportionment
decisions--that states entitled to multi-member House delegations will have district populations
that diverge quite substantially from the national average. In 1990, for instance, by my
calculation fourteen states (Maine, Rhode Island, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Delaware, Kentcuky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado and
New Mexico) with a total of forty-four representatives had average district populations that
were more than 40,000 people more or fewer than the 572,466 people representing 1/435 of the
168

The other branches of the national government do not particularly fare better in liberal
terms. It is by now a commonplace (though not a terribly instructive one169 ) that the federal
courts are a “counter-majoritarian” branch of government. And while the President (and VicePresident) are elected in a single nationwide popular election, the votes are not counted one at a
time. It is state votes that are counted, and the weight of each state’s say in the so-called
“electoral college” where the votes are tallied is proportionate not to population, but to the
combination of Senate and House delegations--a rather different matter, as we have seen.170
Again it is not often that the Presidential winner has a smaller popular vote total than an
opponent, though that can happen, and has.171 More importantly perhaps, states get to decide
important matters about how their electoral votes are distributed. Most states award their votes
as a unit, and that greatly increases the importance of the popular vote in states with large
electoral college weighting.172 Candidates for President undoubtedly respond to that incentive in
their campaigning, in the substantive stances they take, and in the appearances they make.173
Further complexity is introduced by the fact that the three branches of the national
government divide power, and are, of course, superimposed on a variety of state governments, as
well as local units subordinate to the states. Power over particular subjects is often shared among
these different levels. This further bedevils any attempt to trace some liberal weighting of
interests through the system as a whole.

national apportionment population. See Statistical Abstract, supra note [2]; Lavin, supra note
[16], at 367. The Court thus moved too fast in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), when it
leaped from the correct observation that “only four States have less than 1/435 of the country’s
total population under the 1960 census” to the conclusion that “only four seats are distributed on
a basis other than strict population.” 377 U.S. at 572.
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See generally Bennett, supra note [10].
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Specifically in the elections of 1824, 1876, and 1888. See Longley & Peirce, supra note
[87], at 32-34.
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See id. at 127-53.

I have in mind not only formal candidates in the midst of campaigns, but aspirants to the
office at any time. There are, of course, other pressures, like the early scheduling of the New
Hampshire primary, but the electoral college rules and procedures surely loom large over contests
for the American presidency.
173

Many of the formal mechanisms of American politics that frustrate a liberal summation of
interests were consciously inserted with something of a republican vision in mind. For instance,
the relatively long terms of office for Senators, and even for members of the House, were, as we
have seen,174 provided in part so that the legislators could enjoy a degree of insulation from
constituent pressures, the better to deliberate about the public good. We have seen that
bicameralism might be depicted in similar terms, and it is even possible to put something of a
republican “public interest” gloss on such things as the Presidential veto and judicial review. It
does seem likely that “public interest” deliberation, in which legislators and other officials feel
free to pursue their own best judgments about public policy largely free from constituent
pressure, is a real part of the decisionmaking design in American government.175
At the same time, there can be little doubt that organized interest groups effectively wield
great political power.176 From one perspective the power of interest groups is indicative of
responsive government--”responsive” in the sense of government that turns constituent interest
into public policy not particularly as a result of reasoning about it, but simply because it is what
at least some constituents want. The result is not likely liberal responsiveness, because there is
no reason to think that it is responsiveness that is distributed in even approximately equal
measure across the electorate--in either of the two senses we distinguished earlier.177 Precisely
because it is responsiveness, however, it is not republican, for the republican legislator may listen
attentively, but decides on his own.
v. pluralist integration. The foregoing litany of ambiguities, qualifications and
compromises of the liberal ideal is well-known to students of democratic decisionmaking and of
American government.178 Despite this familiarity, there persists a widespread belief that the
liberal ideal is to a great extent fulfilled in the operation of American democracy. The most
sophisticated version of this belief is associated with the “pluralist” strain in American political
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See Farber & Frickey, Law and Public Choice 21 (U. Chi. Press 1991) (discussing work of
Richard Fenno).
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Even though skeptical of the more extreme claims made about interest group influence,
Farber and Frickey would probably not quarrel with this assertion. Id. at 12-21.
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The text only scratches the surface of the subject, however, for the ability of American
democracy to respond in equal measure to the policy preferences or interests of those taken to be
entitled to regard is hemmed in by a host of additional constraints. See Bennett, supra note [10],
at 499-500 n.46.
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science. The word “pluralism” is often used to characterize a system in which organized interest
groups are dominant, and legislative outcomes are simply “‘the balance of . . . group
pressure.’” 179 But there is a more optimistic note associated with pluralism, in which in the
complexity of interest group battles each person is likely sometimes to win and sometimes to
lose, with the results more or less canceling each other out. The final accounting then supposedly
approximates a liberal ideal (though whether the pure or intensity version is typically left
unsaid). The idea is captured in the words that Robert Dahl puts in the mouth of “Pluralist” in
one of the dialogues Dahl creates for his 1989 book, Democracy and Its Critics:
in a democratic order on a large scale of a country, associational pluralism,
combined with a good deal of decentralization of decisions to local governments,
would help to ensure that the interests of citizens in the different publics would
be given more or less equal consideration. In that sense, the public good would be
achieved in a pluralist democracy.180
One commentator who expressed such an optimistic pluralism was Alexander Bickel. In
the same work where he coined the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty” to raise a warning
sign about policymaking by the courts, Bickel displayed an appreciation of the fact that the rest
of the system might not be all that majoritarian either. He acknowledged “the . . . important
complicating factor” of the disproportionate political power of interest groups. But Bickel was
consoled, because, the Supreme Court apart, it was all likely to work its way out to a liberal
bottom line. The legislature and the executive represent different constituencies, he explained,
and this “tends to cure inequities of over- and underrepresentation.” And groups can in the final
analysis be effective politically only by “combining in some fashion, . . . [and] constituting a
majority.”181
While there does not seem to be any decisive basis on which to defeat the optimistic
pluralist conclusion, neither is there much reason for crediting it. For it is hard to fathom the
mechanism by which some coherent liberal bottom line is reached. It is possible that the evidence
is indirect, an inference drawn from the stability in the system. If the liberal vision is a broadly
See Farber & Frickey, supra note [175], at 13 (quoting Bentley, The Process of
Government 258-59 (1908)).
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Dahl, supra note [68], at 295.

Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 18 (1962). Another commentator in the pluralist
tradition, in expressing his skepticism about the usefulness of the Supreme Court’s one person
one vote apportionment standard, put it this way: “in the complex politics of group bargaining
and shifting temporary majorities that we actually have in the United States, inequalities in voting
strength may contribute in [sic] the over-all equality of all participants in the political process as
a whole.” Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court 249 (Free Press 1964).
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attractive one, and if the system is perceived as yielding liberal results, then widespread
satisfaction and stability might be thought to follow. But there is no apparent accounting system
even for knowing a liberal bottom line when we reach it, so it is quite unclear how the perception
would even get started. It seems plausible enough to expect instability in an open democratic
society like the United States if there is widespread and deeply held dissatisfaction with
governmental decisions extending over a substantial period of time. The stability we observe
suggests that there is no such extent or level of dissatisfaction. It may also suggest some rough
compromise of satisfactions in our polar liberal senses is sufficient to keep dissatisfaction under
control, even if there is also a good measure of inequality and legislator discretion along the way.
In the end that may be what grounds the pluralist faith.182 But that is a far cry from any
suggestion that some coherent conception of liberal results can be inferred from stability in the
system. Most likely pluralists have succumbed to the temptation noted earlier to allow liberal
normative predispositions (however ill defined) to migrate to descriptive accounts of a system
they know they like.183 In any event, there is a more plausible account of the stability in the
system than an insistence that it is liberal results that bring that stability about.

C. A Positive Theory of American Democracy.
i. summary of the theory. The very complexity of American democracy that helps
confound a liberal account of its operation suggests an alternative. American democracy in all its
complexity can be understood as a mechanism of involvement of the citizenry with a diverse
menu of public conversation about public policy. Bicameralism, federalism, and separation of
powers divide up issues and constituencies in a large variety of ways and provide multiple focal
points for communication between candidates and officials, on the one hand, and their
constituents (and the groups they form) on the other. That communication in turn helps
stimulate a secondary conversation about public affairs among and between diverse media of
communication and segments of the populace at large that sum to essentially all of it. A highly
speech protective interpretation of the First Amendment allows this conversation to flower in a
multitude of ways. To a great extent the resulting public conversation is designed to draw the
population into concern with and a sense of engagement by public matters, and there seems good
This time speaking in his own voice, Robert Dahl says that the institutions of democracy
“make it unlikely . . that a government will long pursue policies that deeply offend a majority of
citizens.” Dahl, supra note [68], at 223. See also Shapiro, Three Fallacies Concerning
Majorities, Minorities, and Democratic Politics, in Nomos XXXII at 79, 108, Majorities and
Minorities (Chapman & Wertheimer eds. (1990) (“pluralism was thought to distribute political
satisfaction . . . widely. . . . [so that no] particular group will lose so often as to have no
commitment to the system and nothing to lose but its proverbial chains”).
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TAN , supra; see Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions,
15 Yale Law & Policy Rev. 553, 564 (1997).
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reason to believe that in substantial measure it succeeds. The conversational involvement is then
an important stabilizing force in the system.
The American complexity provides a dazzling variety of public conversational subjects,
from the weightiest matter of economic theory, through the peccadilloes of one public servant or
another, to the choice of playground equipment for the local park. We can distinguish two
different reasons why conversation on such topics might be involving, though I do not think the
line between the two is sharp. First, conversation might be valued as providing information of
instrumental value. In the public context the conversation might, for instance, be relevant in
obtaining some public benefit. But it could also help in consideration of some particular public
policy in which one has an interest--swings rather than a new slide for that park--or for deciding
how to vote in a candidate election. While an individual might realistically hope to affect the
swings decision--perhaps by making his views known to the local school officials--for matters of
public policy that affect large numbers of people, any individual’s involvement in public
conversation is quite unlikely to be effective in achieving a desired end. Conversational
involvement might nonetheless be instrumentally involving because the individual will take some
concrete action--like casting a vote for a candidate--even if (or as) he appreciates that he has no
real power over the result. And second, the most ordinary of conversation can be involving
largely apart from its instrumental possibilities as part of a developed or developing relationship
between people. So it is with public conversation. The American system of single member
geographically defined districting helps establish primary relations between representatives (or
candidates) and constituents, as well as felt “secondary” attachments by members of the public
with media commentators on public affairs, both of which can then provide the basis for
conversational involvement of a relational sort.184 These two types of involvement are not fully
distinct, because they likely feed on each other, just as instrumental and relational conversational
involvement do in everyday life. Thus while the two may at times, as we shall see,185 compete,
more typically they will go hand in hand. Both are a function of the embeddedness of the
conversation in a shared societal enterprise where decisions of real world importance are to be
made.
For most members of the electorate most of the time, participation in the public
conversation will be passive. There are simply too many members of the public to imagine that
it could be otherwise. But given that constraint, the conversational possibilities are adaptable to
varying tastes, interests, talents, schedules, and indeed inclinations toward active or passive
participation.

Cf. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1974) (“when candidates are elected at large,
residents of particular areas within the district may feel that they have no representative
specially responsible to them”).
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There is, of course, public conversation in non-democratic countries, but its subject
matter is typically limited and its content repetitive. Conversation that breaks out of those
constraints will likely be limited in its circulation. Wide-ranging and varied public conversation
seems to be a peculiarly democratic phenomena, and perhaps especially an American one.
Competitive elections are the crucial stimulus for this conversation. While the liberal account has
elections directing a process of producing governmental decisions, this conversational account
depicts elections instead as providing an incentive structure for involving conversation. For it is
those elections that give candidates and officials the incentive to reach diverse constituencies and
to do so in a way that stimulates a sense that the conversation is directed to them because their
attention to it matters. That primary conversation between candidates and constituents is then
important in stimulating the secondary conversation. Precious little public conversation is in fact
tailored to identified individuals. But where competitive elections prevail, both candidates and
media do have real incentives to match audiences with information and messages of interest. The
adaptability and directedness of the public conversation is in marked contrast to the blunt
instrument that the vote represents as a supposed means to fine tune liberal results.
The popular involvement in public conversation I have in mind need not be particularly
inspired or enlightening.186 All that is required for the stabilizing effect I posit is that members
of the electorate get caught up in it in a way that produces a sense of genuine involvement in the
public processes of the land. So conceived, the conversation is not nearly as attractive a
phenomenon as what contemporary republican theorists have in mind when they speak of
popular involvement in a “deliberative democracy,”187 but then theirs is a normative account,
while democracy as meaningful conversation purports to the take the conversation as it finds it in
the real world.
In that real world, to be sure, the conversational possibilities are not unlimited. A
candidate for public office may have to choose, for instance, between emphasizing park or
peccadillo. In addition, one form of conversational involvement may compete with another. If
district lines are drawn to maximize political competitiveness, for instance, that should in turn
maximize the incentives of candidates to employ a diverse menu of conversational topics to be
directed toward the entire voting population of the district. The incentive extends to reaching the
marginal voter in ways short of alienating larger numbers of voters than will be attracted.
Non-competitive districts, on the other hand, where relative political homogeneity reigns, may
dampen that incentive while simultaneously fostering the conversational engagement that comes

This is so even apart from the concentration on personality and peccadillo of public
officials. In a recent congressional race in Kentucky, for instance, stock car racing was reported
to demand a lot of the attention of the candidates and the electorate. See “A Fast-Track Battle
Of A Different Kind,” New York Times, July 20, 1998, p. A20 (midwest edition).
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from a relationship born of felt political kinship between representative and constituents.188
This is not to say that competitive elections must necessarily crowd out relational
conversational involvement. Just as we may disagree with those with whom we have quite
intense private relationships, so a voter may feel relationally involved with a representative with
whom he disagrees on a range of issues. But whether competing or not, primary conversational
involvement of either the instrumental or relational variety is largely independent of the numerical
division of the population among districts. To be sure, extremes of malapportionment may make
it abundantly clear to voters in a disfavored district that neither they nor their representatives
really matter in a range of public policy discussions.189 If such a state of affairs persists, the
sense of involvement on the part of the disfavored portion of the populace may wither. Short of
such extremes, however, the interactions in which a voter finds conversational engagement are
focused at the electoral level and for that reason can remain robust in the face of a good measure
of interdistrict malapportionment--as the example of the United States Senate dramatically
demonstrates. To all appearances elections for the Senate foster a high level of popular
engagement even in those populous states which are substantially disfavored by the Senate
apportionment by States.
The descriptive force of the conversational account is not attributable to any “original
intention” to design American institutions to maximize or foster public conversation. The
accuracy of the conversational account is instead a product of the operation of something akin to
evolutionary selection. The great architectural decisions about the structure of American
government were likely fed by normative visions like the liberal and republican ones we examined
in Part III, and by the need to compromise among such visions and among various interests in
play at the times those decisions were taken. Once set on their way, however, institutions
change their form for various reasons that may have had little to do with their origins. Political
parties, for instance, are now central actors in American public life, though our formal
constitutional scheme contemplates no role for them whatsoever. The changes that survive
within the structure as a whole will be those that foster survival of the whole, or at least do not
seriously or repeatedly jeopardize that survival. Political systems can, of course, survive a
measure of instability, but probably not instability that comes without surcease. If democratic
conversation promotes political stability, conversation promoting mechanisms can for that reason
be expected to endure over time, whether or not there was any original intention to foster that
conversation.
Cf., e.g., Mayhew Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the
Districts, in Polsby, Reapportionment in the 1970s, at 257 (1971) (asking “[w]hat is wrong . . .
with having at least some congressmen . . . who apparently ‘speak for’ overwhelming majorities
of their constituents?”).
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I return to this possibility in an attempt to integrate the Supreme Court’s apportionment
jurisprudence into a conversational picture of American democracy. See TAN , infra.
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The role of competitive elections as stimulus to conversation can be appreciated by
considering the proposal occasionally advanced in pursuit of the liberal vision that the legislature
be chosen not by election but by lot, or by some other random procedure.190 If large enough, the
resulting legislature might approximate that microcosm of the “electorate” as a whole that some
liberal theorists imagined.191 While a random selection procedure might in this way be thought to
produce results in the liberal image, it would simultaneously alter the conversational
characteristics of American government, most likely in very dramatic ways. Unless perchance
the randomly chosen legislator remained in office for a long time (which itself might defeat much
of the liberal purpose), little relational involvement of the electorate could be expected. More
likely, members of the citizenry would remain essentially ignorant of the identities of those
deciding on their behalf. In addition, random selection would eliminate competitive elections and
hence the incentive that candidates now have to reach out conversationally to the electorate.
Lobbying might continue, in which various interests tried to convince the legislators who happen
to have been chosen about what those legislators should think. But the great bulk of the
populace seems likely be left out in the conversational cold. No longer would members of the
electorate have reason to believe that public conversation was directed to them because their
attention to it mattered.
A conversational perspective brings a good measure of coherence to a large number of
features of American democracy, formal and informal. The theory can help make sense not only
of American governmental complexity and of the central role of the First Amendment in
American jurisprudence, but of the American tradition and practice of loose political party
discipline, the pervasive suspicion of special interest groups, and why it is that people bother to
vote at all.192 I turn shortly to conversational analyses of the apportionment and
enfranchisement phenomena on which we have been focusing, but first let me call attention to
two peculiarly American political institutions where a conversational account fleshes out a
picture that without it is rather mystifying. These are the United States Senate, sharing
legislative power with the much more fairly apportioned House of Representatives, and the
United States Supreme Court, exercising a good measure of policymaking authority despite the
fact that its members are appointed rather than elected and effectively serve for as long as they
like.
A conversational theory explains why the United States Senate apparently enjoys broad
See Amar, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J. 1283 (1984);
Mueller, supra note [68], at 316. Hannah Pitkin discusses this idea in Pitkin, supra note [74], at
73-75.
190

191

See TAN

, infra.

192

See Bennett, supra note [10], at 511-30.

popular support, despite its gross violation of the liberal apportionment ideal. From the start the
Senate has exercised legislative power essentially as a coequal partner with the House. In this
respect the American Senate is unusual if not unique among “upper” chambers of national
bicameral legislatures. But the method by which Senators are chosen has changed in ways that
have important conversational implications. They were originally selected by the state
legislatures.193 For a variety of reasons, this proved unsatisfactory, and over a protracted period
of time the states introduced elements of popular involvement in senatorial selection.194 This
eventuated in the Seventeenth Amendment under which Senators are now, like members of the
House of Representatives, elected “by the people.” Part of the idea of the original selection plan
was to create a distance between Senators and the populations of their respective states, all in the
service of republican deliberation.195 Both because of the extreme disproportions of populations
among the states, and because of the inevitable slippage in projecting electoral sentiment through
representative government,196 the introduction of popular election did not come close to making
the Senate into a liberal organ of government. Yet despite the fact that the Senate might now
seem to reside in an ideological no man’s land of American politics, to all appearances it is a
thriving institution.
The principal reason, I posit, is that as presently constituted the Senate is an especially
suitable vehicle for stimulating public conversation--of both a relational and an instrumental sort.
The apportionment scheme for the Senate provides incentives for an ample menu of instrumental
conversation. While not all states have highly competitive political divisions, the stability of
district lines for the Senate (i.e., state lines197 ) establishes a framework in which competition is
importantly free from the threat that incumbents will move the lines around for their own benefit.
And even more clearly, for conversational involvement of a relational sort the Senate has a
distinct advantage over the House. The stability of the district lines and the six year terms of
office for the Senate must make it easier for constituents to keep track of their Senators’
identities and of what they say. The result seems likely to be the easier development of a sense
of relationship with Senators than with members of the House, despite the fact that because they
typically serve larger populations it is harder to produce Senators with broad based ideological
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House districts in those states entitled to only a single representative for a protracted
period enjoy a similar advantage. Without elaborating on the reasons, Justice Harlan noted the
importance of stable district lines in his Reynolds dissent. 377 U.S. at 621,
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attachment to the great bulk of their constituents.198
Like the Senate, the United States Supreme Court is an “illiberal” governmental institution
that exercises a large measure of policymaking authority. But unlike the Senate, the Supreme
Court’s exercise of policymaking prerogative is recurrently criticized in American political
discourse. The criticism most typically employs Alexander Bickel’s warning of a
“counter-majoritarian difficulty” posed by the Court,199 but that way of putting it is decidedly
unhelpful in understanding any contrast with the Senate. For neither is very close to a
“majoritarian” institution.
A conversational perspective brings the contrast into focus. Unlike the Senate, the Court
has little incentive to foster any popular sense of involvement in its decisionmaking processes.
The Court’s traditions, indeed, run in just the opposite direction. As a court, it stands prepared
to listen attentively to the litigants before it, but the views of more broadly based segments of the
population that may be affected by its decisions are assumed to be irrelevant. The Court does, of
course, hear from non-litigants through amicus briefs, but these are difficult and expensive to
produce and have never been thought to be central to the Court’s decisionmaking processes. To
be sure, there are those who believe that the Court listens more than it admits, but it certainly
does little to make the population directly aware of any listening it does.

Bill Marshall has pressed me on the question of whether the United States would be more
stable if there were no House of Representatives, or perhaps if the allocation of voting power
among the states in the House approximated that of the Senate, with permanent--and hence
stable--district lines within states. I cannot do justice to the question here, but I would think of
the bicameralism and the malapportionment questions as quite distinct. The Senate without a
House of Representatives, would raise a danger that substantial segments of the population,
particularly in populous states, would come to feel that nobody was talking their language.
Neglected segments might get little useful information from their Senators and, partly in
consequence, resist being drawn into a conversational relationship. See TAN , infra.
Bicameralism, with the two chambers chosen in quite different ways, is no guarantee against such
alienation, but it does enrich the conversational mix. At the present time, for instance, the smaller
size of House districts may stimulate more conversation with pressing informational content
about things of local importance. That may in turn make it easier for constituents to develop a
sense of relationship, even with Senators with whom they often disagree. The hypothesized
bicameral realignment would likely retain much of this conversational potential.
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Bickel, supra note [179], at 16. Bickel explained that “when the Supreme Court declares
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it. . . . [This] is the reason the charge can be made that judicial
review is undemocratic.” Id. at 16-17.
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There are, of course, salient differences between the Senate and the Supreme Court other
than their conversational inclinations. Even since the advent of popular election of its members,
the Senate serves to keep national and state concerns in touch with each other, while the Supreme
Court is a more purely national institution. Therein may lie part of the explanation for the lack
of controversy that surrounds the “counter-majoritarian” Senate. But the conversational contrast
of the Court and the modern Senate could hardly be more stark. This has led me to suggest that
the democratic “difficulty” with the Court is more aptly termed “counter-conversational” than
“counter-majoritarian.”200 Labels aside, the greater controversy that surrounds Court
policymaking fits comfortably into a conversational account of American democracy.
A conversational theory does not by any means capture the full complexity of the
American political system.201 But it does bring a degree of order to American reality, and it
certainly acts as an effective antidote to the descriptive accuracy sometimes claimed or suggested
for liberal accounts. In what follows I would like to give a sense of the coherence a
conversational account can provide (as well as its limitations), by concentrating on the
phenomena that have shaped our inquiry, the law and practice of electoral apportionment, and
distribution of the franchise.
ii. the apportionment base. Along with the franchise, the inclusion and exclusion of large
parts of the population in the apportionment base seems crucial for the liberal project, for
together they define who counts in the liberal calculus, whom it is the society must heed equally.
In these terms, however, the Court’s casual approach to the base in Burns v. Richardson, 202
seems incoherent, at least for decisionmaking on a national basis. Under Burns some states could,
for instance “count” the interests of children, while other states did not. But the impact of
national policy cannot typically be disaggregated by states, so each type of delegation would be
left to wonder what to make of the costs or benefits that following its representational
responsibilities will produce for other states. The very best that might be hoped for in liberal
terms would be a confused compromise between incommensurable calculations.
Through a conversational lens, however, Burns v. Richardson makes perfect sense
(though that does not allow it to rest any more easily in the liberal company of Wesberry and
Reynolds). For conversational purposes, the important thing about the apportionment base is
not its composition, but its contribution to a political system that stimulates involving
conversation. The usual practice of dividing up the entire population is satisfactory, but so
would be the exclusion from the base of one or another group of ineligible voters. It is their
enfranchisement or disenfranchisment that has the immediate conversational implications, not
200
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inclusion or exclusion in the apportionment count. Indeed, one or another group of eligible voters
might be excluded from the apportionment base with no necessary conversational consequences.
Something like this already effectively happens when certain eligible voters--like college
students--are counted for census, and hence apportionment, purposes not where they vote but
on the college campuses where they live. There actually may be untoward conversational
consequences of that practice, since candidates may not know how to reach out to those voters.
There would be no such problem with exclusion from the apportionment base of eligible voters
who live and vote in a single location so that candidates know where to direct their conversation.
iii. equinumerosity. A conversational perspective might also help us understand why the
Court imposed so much less rigorous an interpretation of the equality norm in the context of
state and local legislative bodies than it did in the congressional context. According to the Court,
the difference is that states have an interest in following internal political lines when they draw
up districts for state legislative purposes, because local units of government often have special
interests and special perspectives that can usefully be brought to bear in state legislatures.203
This is an explanation that is suggestive of conversational sensitivity in the state apportionment
process. Districting along lines of common interests may not maximize electoral competitiveness
and for that reason may dampen the incentives of some candidates to reach out to marginal
voters. But such districting does help foster conversation in two different ways. It allows the
representative to focus his conversational energy on informational areas known to concern large
numbers of constituents. And it facilitates the sense of relationship between constituents and
representatives that comes from making common cause.
To a substantial degree, however, the same could be said of the national legislative
process, where geographically clumped interests may be under consideration, like those of cities
and agricultural areas and of racial and ethnic groups. To be sure, congressional districts are likely
to be more populous than state legislative districts and hence, other things being equal, harder to
apportion along lines of common interests. But this suggests that the conversational difference
between congressional and state contexts is more a matter of degree than kind.204 There are,
moreover, considerations the Court ignored that suggest reversing its order of stringency for the
equality norm. The constitutional language on which the Court relied for the congressional
requirement is less directed to any norm of equality.205 And very substantial deviation from the
203

See TAN

, supra.

204

See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 780-82 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).

In Wesberry, the Court relied on Article I’s requirement that the House of
Representatives be selected “by the people of the several states.” This could well have been
taken simply as contrasting language with the original provision for selection of Senators “by the
legislature[s from each state],” carrying no special implications for apportionment. Reynolds, in
contrast, rested on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See TAN , supra.
205

one person one vote standard is virtually inevitable in the congressional context, where the
constitutional requirement that each state have one representative makes it overwhelmingly likely
that some districts will have populations approaching fifty percent greater than others.206 There
is no such impediment to essentially perfect realization of the equality norm in the state context.
The net result is that while the Court’s rationale for its different treatment of
congressional and state legislative apportionment has some plausiblity, it is far from decisive. An
alternative explanation for the difference in treatment is that after its initial rush of enthusiasm,
the Court began to appreciate the very real difficulties in the one person one vote
solution--difficulties understandable in part at least in conversational terms. The formal
differences between the two contexts may then have provided a convenient hook on which the
Court could hang a growing ambivalence.
None of this is to say that a return to English style rotten boroughs would have no
untoward conversational implications. It was apparent when Baker v. Carr207 was before the
Court that a large part of the apportionment problem was the self-interest of legislators in
maintaining the status quo. As Justice Clark put it in concurring that the malapportionment of
the Tennessee legislature was justiciable:
I would not consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if there
were any other relief available to the people of Tennessee. But . . . . [t]he
majority of the voters have been caught up in a legislative strait jacket. . . . This is
because the legislative policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to
their respective constituencies, and by the votes of their incumbents a
reapportionment of any kind is prevented.208
This “legislative strait jacket,” or, as it was called in Reynolds, a “rural strangle hold,”209 had
important conversational implications. Voters in districts made politically impotent at the state
level by gerrymandering may have felt relational ties to their representatives. But the state
political marginalization of such constituents would have caused even relationally charged
conversation to ring hollow, since it made clear that the representatives of those marginalized
constituencies were not genuine players in large parts of the public debate. Moreover, the
marginalization gave every sign of being chronic. The result could be popular cynicism and
See Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 577
(D.D.C. 1980); TAN , supra.
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detachment, rather than a sense of involvement.210 The net effect of the Court’s intervention
may then have been to unsettle a conversationally stifling environment.
Any such reading of the Court’s effort must be qualified in two important respects.
First, after the dust had settled, the equinumerosity requirement, even when most stringently
applied, leaves plenty of room for partisan gerrymandering and incumbent protection.211 Indeed,
the Court’s apportionment jurisprudence may help camouflage the continuing prevalence of
incumbent self-dealing.212 And second, it is important to emphasize that we are bumping up
against competition among types of conversational involvement. To the extent that incumbent
protection is unsettled, politics may become more competitive, and that in turn may lead
candidates to reach out conversationally to marginal voters. At the same time, stable district lines
and even incumbent protection may foster relational involvement, for voters will find it easier to
keep track of their representatives if they know their districts, and if the same people remain in
office for extended periods of time.213 The Court’s one person one vote solution provides no
way to square this circle, though neither would Justice Clark’s solution, which was to allow
apportionment flexibility as long as it was grounded in rationale state concerns.214
Conversational tradeoff is required. That may be what the Court provided in the state legislative
context. In the congressional context, however, the Court displayed little sensitivity to the
subtler conversational implications of its efforts. For these reasons, a conversational account of
the Court’s use of the equinumerosity requirement has some, but certainly not overwhelming,
appeal.

Cf. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
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A similar point could be made about a conversational tradeoff between homogenous and
heterogeneous districts. The former may foster some sorts of conversational involvement by
allowing the great bulk of a district’s population to identify with the representatives. But the
latter will be associated with a more competitive political environment and hence a greater
incentive on the part of candidates to communicate with even marginal voters.
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369 U.S. at 258. Neither really does much to impede a high degree of self-protective
manipulation by incumbents. Polsby & Popper, supra note 209, at 669; see, e.g., Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996).
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iv. the pattern of adult eligibility to vote. With very minor exceptions,215 the distribution
of the franchise has moved in one direction over the course of American history. The vote has
been extended to additional categories of adults, and the enfranchisement line between children
and adults has been edged younger to expand the electorate. This has come despite the fact that
such expansion rubs a bit against the republican grain, and also dilutes the decisionmaking power
of the preexisting electorate in any liberal calculus that one might have supposed was at work.
A conversational account of American democracy comfortably accommodates the
extension of the franchise in this way. When formerly marginalized groups are brought into the
electorate, that provides incentives for their involvement in public conversation. Such
conversational involvement helps defuse the possibility of alienation, and hence destabilizing
behavior, in those newly eligible groups.
The process may not be untroubled, even in conversational terms. Inclusion in the
franchise of racial minorities or of newly naturalized immigrant groups may arouse opposition,
even resulting in alienation among the opposed. The opposition may be fed by a fear of
disempowerment. Whatever political power accrues to the new groups may be seen as coming at
the expense of the old. At the extreme, a perception of lost political power can cause
disengagement from politics and from its conversation. But the American experience has by and
large been that reconciliation to the expanded electorate eventually comes. The conversational
explanation for the reconciliation is simply that it becomes clear that additional groups can be
included conversationally without concomitant or even serious diminution of the conversational
involvement of preexisting groups.
I do not want to exaggerate the point. To the extent that politics is a matter of dividing
up a limited pie of public resources, new groups compete with old ones, and public conversation
will not completely obscure that fact. But not all conversational topics are directed to the
eventual expenditure of strictly limited resources. New groups may be interested--or may be
induced to be interested--in topics that are relatively costless and of little interest to others. And
the large variety of officeholders in American democracy provides the opportunity for relational
involvement that can simultaneously bring a measure of satisfaction to old and new members of
the electorate alike. But most fundamentally, the conversational account rests on a perception
During the nineteenth century a number of states excluded paupers from the franchise.
See Issacharoff, Karlan, & Pildes, The Law of Democracy 31 (1998). And more recently, the
number of states permanently disenfranchising some ex-felons appears to have increased slightly
between 1986 and 1996 (from eleven to fourteen). See Olivares, Burton & Cullen, The Collateral
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later,
60-SEP Fed. Probation 10, 11 (1996). (One 1989 count came up with fifteen. Note, The
Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,”
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1300 (1989)). There may well have been other perturbations over the years
within states, either in their formal requirements, or in the vigor of their enforcement efforts in
protecting voting rights for certain groups.
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that political satisfaction derives fully as much from involvement as it does from results.
The reasons for the continuing adult disenfranchisement surely vary from group to group,
and in some cases remain obscure.216 And while disenfranchisement cannot find any
fundamental explanation in conversational terms, the remaining disenfranchisement is relatively
insignificant. In addition, the marginal conversational dampening produced by the
disenfranchisement is likely attenuated to one degree or another for several of the disenfranchised
groups. In this sense, the pattern of enfranchisement as a whole can be seen as the product in
significant measure of conversational dynamics.
Residents of the District of Columbia, for instance, do vote in both Presidential and local
elections, and for that reason are the objects of conversational attention by officials and
candidates. In addition, they live in the midst of a public conversational storm about national
matters. In some cases they may find very substantial interest in elements of the nationally
focused public conversation because of their professional concerns. And they do attain a
measure of national conversational engagement through their non-voting representative in the
House.
Citizens resident in overseas American territories, in contrast, are given no formal vote in
Presidential elections. Because of their distance from the bulk of the population and territory of
the country, however, their capacity for destabilizing conduct is probably limited and easily
ignored. In addition, there may be a question of the incentive of this population to engage in
destabilizing conduct, since citizens in the overseas territories may already obtain many benefits
of citizenship without some of its burdens.217
Among other groups, imprisoned felons are capable of destabilizing conduct, but it might
be doubted that their disenfranchisement contributes in any significant way to the
disenchantment many of them undoubtedly feel. And a substantial portion of legally resident
aliens consists of persons serving a probationary period awaiting citizenship, which will of
course bring eligibility to vote. For that group, officeholders and candidates have a degree of
incentive to direct conversation their way on account of future possibilities. Even for the
resident alien population with neither intention nor prospect of obtaining citizenship, there may
be conversational incentive on the part of representatives to the extent that such persons are seen
as influential with persons who do vote.
At least apart from the anomalous case of the District of Columbia (and perhaps that of
citizens in the overseas territories), the most questionable disenfranchisement in conversational
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terms is that of ex-felons. Though geographically dispersed and not easily organized or
galvanized, this is a fairly sizeable group218 that when neglected may have real potential for
acting in destabilizing ways. Giving it a conversational stake would thus seem particularly likely
to pay stabilizing dividends. Some such reasoning may lie behind the gradual erosion in the
inclination of states to continue restrictions on voting for those who have completed serving
sentences for serious crimes.219
v. the disenfranchisement of children and inattention to the extra votes idea. A
conversational perspective comfortably accommodates the disenfranchisement of children, and
also provides a context in which the idea of extra votes for their parents does not excite attention.
With the line of causation between voter inputs and public policy outputs largely beyond
comprehension, the satisfaction of voters is produced by conversational involvement. To
produce levels of dissatisfaction that might lead to destabilizing behavior, there must be an
excluded group that feels the pain of conversational exclusion. Even without extra votes, parents
are not excluded, and the typical disinterest of children means that for the most part they feel no
such pain.
The one vote adult parents each receive as citizens provides officials and candidates--as
well as media of communication--with incentive to talk to them. Extra votes would do no
obvious harm in this respect, but neither would they likely heighten the candidate incentive, at
least as long as parents of underage children represent a substantial portion of the electorate.
Indeed, because they are interested in the welfare of their children in addition to themselves,
parents might already be thought to have more incentive to vote than others. If candidates
respond to such a perception, that only heightens their interest in communicating with parents,
even with no extra votes in the picture. 220
A conversational reckoning of the disenfranchisement of children is more complicated.
Very young children are uninterested in receiving communication about matters of public policy.
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Even without the added votes under discussion, there is a “paradox” of voting by parents
(as well as by any other voters), given the extreme unlikelihood of any single voter determining
the outcome of an election in a district of any appreciable size. On the paradox of voting, see
generally Mueller, Public Choice 120-24 (1979). In a large district the chances would not become
significant even with two or three votes. Parents and others do, of course, exhibit such
“paradoxical” behavior, but the reasons that impel them to do so--a sense of “civic duty” or of
participation with others in the enterprise of governance--seem likely to be independent of the
number of votes they might cast, at least in the range we are considering. See Bennett, supra note
[10], at 522-23.
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They are preoccupied with more immediate gratifications. As children mature and crave
communication about matters in the public realm, they are likely to find it available and adaptable
to their interests and needs, even as they remain without the vote. For the vote is in prospect for
older children, and they are (sometimes at least) in communication with enfranchised parents.
Candidates thus have a measure of incentive to communicate with older children even before they
become eligible to vote. In addition, children seem likely to be drawn to public conversation
initially as a part of learning about public affairs, a first step on the road to a sense of fuller
involvement. For these initial purposes, children may find a good measure of satisfaction from
the public conversation about them, even if it is not particularly targeted their way. But none of
this is to deny that older children are both capable of destabilizing behavior and may feel
conversationally neglected. Indeed some such perception may have contributed to the
twenty-sixth Amendment extending the right to vote to eighteen years old.221
vi. assessing accuracy. Earlier I criticized the pluralist tradition for advancing an
improbable descriptive account of American political decisionmaking.222 In light of that
criticism, it is fair to ask whether the conversational account fares any better. In neither case is
anything approaching rigorous proof available, not only because controlled experimentation
cannot be conducted, but because neither purports to provide an exhaustive account. In each
case, some piece of the puzzle that does not fit well within the theory could be explained away
as finding its explanation elsewhere. At least in the case of democracy as meaningful
conversation, these problems are compounded by the fact that the conversational engagement on
which the descriptive account turns takes a variety of forms which may compete with each other.
When one form of conversational involvement seems to come up short as explanation, another
can be brought in to do service.223
Despite these admitted problems in establishing any ultimate “truth” for the
conversational depiction, the contrast with pluralism provides a solid foundation for preferring
the conversational account and indeed for according it a measure of respect for its accuracy.
Pluralism is a victim of its own bravado. It purports to characterize connections that not only
cannot be measured, but the mechanisms for effectuation of which are quite mysterious. By
what means would American complexity lead one distortion of the liberal ideal to offset another?
In the absence of any plausible answer to that question, the pluralist account must rest on little
more than faith. I have suggested that the faith is likely grounded at the intersection of an

Some support for the Amendment came from people who hoped it would help “defuse
youthful alienation and unrest.” See American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards
Project, Standards Relating to Rights of Minors, §1.1, Commentary, p. 17.
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apparently successful American system and normative approval of the liberal ideal.224
The conversational account can be related more easily to phenomena with which we are
familiar. We all have experience with public conversation, the ways and the extent to which it
commands our attention. Moreover, we have even greater experience with private conversation
that can be related to the sorts of public conversational involvement that I posit. All this
provides an anchor for assessing a conversational account of engagement in politics. Precisely
because much more is going on in American democracy than conversational involvement, our
conversational experience cannot decisively validate the conversational account. But that
experience does allow us to perform reality checks on conversational claims like those I make
concerning the conversational implications of the extra votes possibility.
The ultimate test of a descriptive theory of large scale social systems is whether the
theory helps us “organise our thoughts”225 about that system in coherent and ultimately in
useful ways. Democracy as meaningful conversation has done just that for me, helping me bring
first a handful, and then a larger group of phenomena of American democracy, into some
semblance of order, where before there was mostly confusion. Some of those new phenomena
have been the persistence of obviously inapt ways of describing real problems, like the fixation of
constitutional commentary with the “counter-majoritarianism” of the Courts. Others have been
sounds of silence, like the silence about the apportionment of the United States Senate and the
political invisibility of children. In this sense, the conversational account has not only helped me
unify “apparently diverse phenomena” but has helped me see things that were hidden without
it.226 It will be a fair test of the “accuracy” of the conversational account whether it can do some
of the same for others.

V. Conclusion

In the early part of the nineteenth century, astronomers assumed that there were seven
planets in our solar system. The eighth, which we now call Neptune, was discovered initially not
because it was observed directly, but because it caused Uranus, then assumed to be the outermost
planet, to move in ways that were aberrant by the light of the prevailing Newtonian conception
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of the mechanisms of planetary movement.227 In similar fashion, the common liberal
conceptualization of the operation of American democracy can help us see things that are
necessary to make that conceptualization work. In particular, the liberal conceptualization
suggests that something is amiss in the political treatment of children. It suggests that extra votes
for parents on account of their children could help put American democracy into a semblance of
liberal order.
But something is still amiss. Neptune turned out to be there, but extra votes are not. The
Newtonian conception held, but the liberal one cannot. And the reason is fairly apparent. The
liberal conception of American democracy is essentially a normative conception that has been put
to descriptive service. Descriptive accounts of large scale social phenomena are never perfect,
and that has helped disguise the deficiencies in the liberal account. But the extra votes possibility
is too central to the liberal account to have its mysterious non-appearance dismissed as just a
small blur in an otherwise clear picture. Widespread indifference and inattention to the extra
votes idea helps point us to other problems with the liberal account, and cumulatively they make
clear that a different conceptualization is needed.
Democracy as meaningful conversation provides an alternative account of American
democracy, in which the system is held together by involving essentially the entire adult
population in that system. The liberal account also entails popular involvement, but liberal
involvement takes the form of the production of results in which each contributor counts for one.
The conversational model is less ambitious. It suggests no definable relationship between the
widespread involvement and outputs of the system. It posits the involvement as itself the
stabilizing force in the system. And it posits that the mechanism of involvement is conversation
about matters in the public realm.
By the conversational account, the extra votes idea has not caught on because it would
serve no particular purpose in bringing stability to American democracy. The one vote parents
now receive is sufficient to provide an incentive structure in which they can be caught up in
public conversation. But unlike planetary movements, American democracy can be unsettled by
normativity that will not be denied. In its normative guise, the liberal vision may thus yet inject
life into the extra votes idea. Our Neptune may yet appear. Until it does, however, we do well
to notice its absence, and see what we might make of it.

The story is engagingly told in Peterson, Newton’s Clock, Chaos in the Solar System
99-119 (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1993).
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